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NEPAL’S FUTURE: IN WHOSE HANDS? 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Nepal’s peace process is in danger of collapse. The fall 
of the Maoist-led government, a mess largely of the 
Maoists’ own making, was a symptom of the deeper 
malaise underlying the political settlement. Consensus 
has steadily given way to a polarisation which has fed 
the more militaristic elements on both sides. While all 
moderate politicians still publicly insist that there is 
no alternative to pursuing the process, private talk of a 
return to war – led by generals of the Nepalese Army 
who have never reconciled themselves to peace – has 
grown louder. Outright resumption of hostilities remains 
unlikely in the short term but only concerted efforts to 
re-establish a minimal working consensus and a national 
unity government including the Maoists can avert the 
likelihood of a more dangerous erosion of trust. Strong 
international backing, with India eschewing short-term 
interference in favour of longer-term guardianship of 
the process it itself initiated, will be essential. 
The immediate cause of the Maoists’ departure from 
government on 4 May 2009 was their bungled attempt 
to dismiss the army chief. As the consent for action 
that they had secured from coalition partners unravelled 
under external pressure, they pushed ahead unilater-
ally. Their legally dubious sacking order prompted an 
even more contentious intervention by the ceremonial 
president to countermand it. Maoist leader Prachanda 
quit on grounds of principle; the question of the bal-
ance of power between prime minister and president 
remains in dispute. 
The Maoist resignation made the formation of a new 
administration an urgent necessity and, by Nepal’s stan-
dards, the transition was relatively prompt and smooth. 
However, the new government, led by the centrist 
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), 
UML, is inherently unstable and incapable of address-
ing the most pressing challenges. Backed by 22 parties, 
it is yet to take full form and its major constituents are 
internally riven. Many UML leaders are openly scepti-
cal of the new government, while the Madhesi Jana-
dhikar Forum (MJF) is now formally split. Between 
them, they have achieved the unlikely feat of making 
the Nepali Congress (NC) look the most cohesive and 
internally democratic of the non-Maoist parties. 
The Maoists had not proved as effective in power as 
many had hoped. Moreover, they alienated two impor-
tant constituencies: India (both by appearing to make 
overtures towards China and by refusing to become 
a pliant, moderate force) and the Kathmandu upper 
middle classes (by making them pay taxes and failing 
to deliver basic services, in particular electricity). Yet 
their main problem is their own refusal to give clear 
and credible assurances on their commitment to politi-
cal pluralism and non-violence. Prominent ideologues 
within the party have given added credence to the 
argument that they will never alter their strategic goal 
of state capture and de facto totalitarian rule. In re-
sponse, the leadership’s insistence that the party has 
embraced multiparty democracy has been less than 
fully convincing. 
On the other side, the army has adopted a more overt, 
assertive political role. It is encouraged and supported 
by many who see it as the only credible opposition to 
the Maoists. It not only survived the republican transi-
tion but has thrived. Helped by timorous parties, it has 
successfully pushed for a substantial budgetary in-
crease, protected its de facto autonomy, retained its 
full strength and pressed for new lethal arms imports – 
in breach of the ceasefire. 
Behind much of the recent instability lies an Indian 
change of course. New Delhi framed the peace deal 
and acted as its de facto guarantor, pressing all parties 
to comply with its terms. Never able to digest the 
Maoist victory and uncomfortable with popular demands 
for change, it has pursued increasingly interventionist 
tactics through proxies in Nepali political parties while 
continuing its policy of ring-fencing the army as the 
most reliable bastion against Maoist takeover or anarchy. 
Its resolute opposition to all but token People’s Lib-
eration Army (PLA) integration has unbalanced the 
peace equation without offering any alternative. 
The background against which Kathmandu’s incestu-
ous intrigues are played out is neither stable nor un-
changing. Public security remains weak, alarmingly so 
in several areas. Local governance remains patchy at best 
and non-existent in places. Peace committees bringing 
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together parties and civil society representatives are 
functional in some districts but lack a coherent agenda. 
Identity-based and other newer political movements 
are impatient with a constitutional process that, while 
not stalled, looks less and less likely to deliver a 
broadly acceptable new constitution on schedule. Civil 
society, a crucial force in the early stages of the peace 
process, is divided and demoralised. 
India’s perceived partisanship has not helped interna-
tional cohesion. From being the leader of the pack, 
successfully lining up other international players be-
hind its strategy, it has become something of a lone 
wolf. It continues to criticise the UN mission, whose 
credibility was dented by a videotape showing Maoist 
leader Prachanda boasting that he had duped them into 
accepting vastly inflated PLA numbers. The UN would 
like to claim success and get out but cannot refuse re-
quests to monitor arms as long as the situation – over 
which it has no direct influence – remains unresolved. 
In the meantime its role in preserving a fragile peace 
and affording Nepal some shelter from total Indian 
domination is under-appreciated. 
Donors are keen to return to normal development ac-
tivities and have been willing to fund the peace proc-
ess. But their patience is wearing thin, conditions for 
business as usual are yet to materialise and interna-
tional funding is subsidising a bloated and unafford-
able security sector. The army alone far outnumbers 
the national civil service; it, cantoned PLA combat-
ants and the paramilitary armed police are of no use in 
addressing the basic need for law and order. 
It is true that all parties are still talking and there is a 
tradition of last-minute deals to stave off disaster. The 
same could happen again. But that should not obscure 
the fact that the rifts between the major players have 
grown wider and the grounds for compromise nar-
rower. Averting a slide back to conflict will require a 
clear-sighted recognition of the dangers, genuine co-
operation between Nepal’s parties to address them and 
much more solid international backing for the process, 
starting with a decisive lead from India. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To All Political Actors Party to the Peace and 
Constitutional Processes: 
1. Recognising that political consensus and a broad-
based government are essential to the peace process, 
a) work without delay to form a national unity gov-
ernment, acknowledging that the democratic 
mandate to lead it still rests with the Maoists; 
b) give shape to the proposed high-level political 
coordination committee for purely peace process-
related issues, ensuring it has a clear agenda, 
regular meetings and the necessary support to 
monitor and implement decisions; 
c) prioritise cooperation at the local level, in par-
ticular by working together to make local peace 
committees effective bodies for dispute resolu-
tion and pursuit of reconciliation; 
d) work urgently towards a deal on the long over-
due re-establishment of local government bodies 
or all-party mechanisms alongside formation of 
a national government; and 
e) put in place an overall peace process monitor-
ing mechanism. 
2. Build confidence by: 
a) adhering to the principle of consultation and 
consensus, focusing on practical measures to 
monitor and implement existing agreements; 
b) recognising that unfulfilled commitments on all 
sides have contributed to a loss of trust and 
agreeing that reciprocity will be needed to 
move forward; 
c) addressing the serious and substantive concerns 
over the president’s role by agreeing a clarifi-
cation of his powers and ensuring his ceremo-
nial office does not become a competing politi-
cal power centre; 
d) dealing with critical areas unaddressed by past 
agreements, in particular by developing plans 
for broader demilitarisation of armed groups, 
criminal mafias and party youth militias, not 
just the PLA; and 
e) keeping the constitutional process on track and 
minimising the knock-on effects of delays that 
have already occurred. 
3. Support the Army Integration Special Committee 
(AISC) in its task of determining options for the 
integration and rehabilitation of Maoist combat-
ants by: 
a) cooperating in reconstituting the AISC, recog-
nising the need to offer balanced representation 
to major parties and to move promptly to sub-
stantive discussion of the major sticking points; 
b) encouraging the technical subcommittee to con-
tinue its work while recognising that it is not in 
a position to resolve major political questions; 
c) clarifying requests for international support to the 
AISC and its technical subcommittee, in particu-
lar by fully exploiting the capacity of the United 
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Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) to channel 
technical assistance; and 
d) tackling the most contentious questions, in par-
ticular by discussing the numbers of combatants 
that could be integrated into the Nepalese Army 
or other forces, seriously considering bench-
marks and timetables for substantive progress 
and being realistic about the near impossibility 
of meeting the latest six-month deadline. 
4. Make the most of international assistance, bearing 
in mind the risks of fading patience, by: 
a) making full use of the UN and other international 
actors’ good offices as well as facilitating the 
work of UNMIN and ensuring it can complete 
its role in Nepal as soon as possible; 
b) setting and adhering to benchmarks to achieve 
this, offering international backers evidence of 
progress and more solid indications that re-
maining elements of the peace deal are moving 
towards implementation; and 
c) demonstrating in practice that unity across par-
ties is the best way of preventing external in-
tervention and prolonged, potentially intrusive, 
political engagement. 
5. Cooperate in boosting the legitimacy of the state 
and political parties by: 
a) increasing internal democracy, building on suc-
cessful examples such as the internal elections 
carried out by the UML’s general convention 
and the Nepali Congress’s parliamentary party; 
b) bringing an end to party youth wings’ illegal 
activities, developing local mechanisms to en-
sure inter-party disputes do not lead to violent 
clashes and denouncing the use of violence for 
political ends; 
c) without barring constructive debate, using party 
disciplinary measures to rein in senior leaders 
who make destabilising public comments that 
undermine the peace process; and 
d) putting repeated commitments to greater inclu-
siveness and socio-economic transformation into 
practice, paying particular attention to the pros-
pects for establishing new standards for im-
plementing the goals of UN Security Council 
resolution 1325 on women’s participation in 
peacebuilding. 
To the Government of Nepal: 
6. Abide by the constitutional requirement to take im-
portant decisions on the basis of consensus among 
the major parties, including those not in govern-
ment. 
7. Address public security concerns by recognising 
that political consensus is essential to restoring law 
and order and using all appropriate mechanisms, 
national and local, to build all-party support for 
effective policing and ending of political interfer-
ence in operational matters. 
8. Address critical questions of justice and impunity 
by pursuing investigations and prosecutions, re-
sponding substantively to the most serious docu-
mented allegations of war crimes and basing new 
legislation on disappearances and the truth and 
reconciliation commission on wide consultation 
and international standards. 
9. Demonstrate commitment to establishing effective 
democratic control over the Nepalese Army (NA) 
and respecting the provisions of the November 
2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and 
Interim Constitution (IC) by: 
a) bringing the NA under meaningful democratic 
control, including establishing parliamentary 
oversight, fully auditing expenditure and devel-
oping the constitutionally mandated work plan 
for democratisation and right-sizing of the army; 
b) respecting the unambiguous ceasefire commit-
ment to refrain from recruitment and weapons 
purchases; 
c) carefully considering the conflict and develop-
ment risks of increasing security budgets and 
focusing instead on fulfilling the constitutional 
commitment to determining the appropriate size 
of the NA and devising a sensible plan for 
reaching it; 
d) issuing and enforcing clear orders to the NA to 
advise on national security policy when re-
quested but refrain from expressing opinions on 
broader constitutional and political issues; and 
e) making a first step towards full human rights 
vetting by refusing promotion to those accused 
of grave violations unless and until credible in-
dependent investigations have been carried out. 
To the Unified Communist Party of Nepal  
(Maoist): 
10. Recognise that concerns over Maoist strategic in-
tent are genuine and well founded and can only be 
addressed by concrete steps such as: 
a) giving more solid guarantees of commitment to 
political pluralism both in theory (for example 
by reconsidering the proposal to ban political 
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parties accused of supporting feudalism and im-
perialism) and in practice (for example by tak-
ing stern action against cadres who threaten, 
assault or obstruct members of other parties); 
b) clarifying the specific questions raised by the 
Shaktikhor video, which appeared to substanti-
ate charges of deception over combatant num-
bers and plans to use “democratisation” to poli-
ticise the national army; and 
c) reaffirming the ceasefire and CPA conditions 
on ceasing all political violence, in word and 
deed. 
11. Convince other parties and the people at large of 
genuine intent to abide by the peace process, for 
example by: 
a) ending the militarised structure and paramilitary 
activities of the Young Communist League 
(YCL), including its occupation of public build-
ings as de facto barracks; 
b) promptly discharging ineligible personnel in the 
cantonments in line with repeated public prom-
ises, cooperating with government and interna-
tional efforts to design and successfully deliver 
appropriate rehabilitation packages; 
c) implementing other unfulfilled past commitments 
such as the return of seized property; and 
d) cooperating with investigations and prosecutions 
of crimes committed during the conflict and 
ceasefire periods. 
To the International Community, in particular 
India, China, the U.S., EU, UN and Donors: 
12. Publicly support the peace process and underline 
international expectations for its successful conclu-
sion by: 
a) emphasising the need for all parties to adhere 
to all aspects of the CPA, IC and other agree-
ments; 
b) supporting effective governance, while recog-
nising that this will only be possible under a 
broad-based national government and urging 
all parties to make the compromises necessary 
to achieve this; 
c) underlining that significant development and 
budgetary assistance is at risk should stable 
governance not be established; 
d) pressuring all parties to use only non-violent 
methods to pursue protests and to avoid exces-
sively disruptive tactics such as blocking the 
functioning of the CA; and 
e) continuing to urge investigations into the worst 
alleged conflict abuses and offering technical 
support as appropriate. 
13. Strengthen international consensus and coordina-
tion by: 
a) addressing the rift between India, which appears 
to have revised its interpretation of the peace 
deal, and other major players, who still support 
the agreements initiated and endorsed by New 
Delhi; 
b) dispelling impressions of waste and confusion 
by getting a grip on the multiple, overlapping 
programs supporting critical areas like the con-
stitutional process and security sector reform; 
and 
c) maintaining a common strong emphasis on 
human rights, political pluralism and conflict 
resolution at the heart of all policies, including 
development aid and military cooperation. 
14. Recognising that delay in reforming the security 
sector is continuing to compromise all development 
efforts by draining resources and undermining po-
litical progress: 
a) seek unambiguous assurances that affordability 
and accountability will be key criteria in any 
consideration of security sector budgets and pol-
icy, and that development funds will not be used 
in effect to subsidise an unsustainably large 
army; 
b) push for democratic control of the security sec-
tor and discuss detailed plans for appropriate 
assistance; 
c) urge prompt measures to address the pressing 
need for improved public security and offer 
support to such steps; and 
d) explore ways to help train integrated NA and 
other security forces, in particular by offering 
conversion training for former PLA combatants, 
including at officer level if requested, and joint 
training to integrated units on working under 
democratic control, respect for human rights, etc. 
To the Government of India: 
15. Given the enduring tradition of intimate Indo-Nepal 
links, use the special relationship constructively to 
secure both Nepal and India’s core interests with-
out attempting to dictate, for example by: 
a) making a clear, public recommitment to the 
fundamentals of the peace process; 
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b) offering public endorsement of the principle of 
PLA integration into the NA and other security 
forces, if agreed by Nepal’s parties and in the 
manner of their choosing; 
c) building on India’s leading example of successful 
civilian control of the military and unique army 
to army links to offer support in areas such as 
building a functional defence ministry and train-
ing army officers and civil servants to work 
effectively alongside one another; 
d) sending firm messages to the Indian army to 
support government policy on Nepal and com-
municate appropriate messages to counterparts 
in the NA; 
e) considering positive steps to support security 
sector reform, including training for former 
Maoist combatants joining the security forces 
and assistance in reshaping policing to meet 
the needs of federalism and improved public 
accountability; and 
f) supporting the UN’s role and using Indian in-
fluence constructively to assist in creating the 
conditions for the winding up Security Coun-
cil-mandated operations. 
To Members of the United Nations  
Security Council: 
16. The Security Council should underline its com-
mitment to supporting the peace process but also 
its concern about weakening consensus and delays 
in addressing key steps by: 
a) considering a Security Council visit to Nepal to 
understand the complex situation and hear di-
rectly from the main political actors how they 
propose to address challenges; 
b) encouraging member states represented in Kath-
mandu to scrutinise progress, offer support as 
necessary and report publicly on progress or 
concerns; 
c) making stronger public messages of support for 
UNMIN’s mission and for Nepal’s parties in 
taking prompt steps to conclude the peace proc-
ess and restructure UN involvement to reflect 
the longer term needs of a successful post-
conflict transition; and 
d) engaging more closely with India to narrow 
differences in perspective and build more solid 
common ground on outside support for the 
peace process. 
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NEPAL’S FUTURE: IN WHOSE HANDS?
I. INTRODUCTION:  
THE FRAYING PROCESS 
Nepal’s peace process rests on a cleverly constructed 
settlement crafted through difficult negotiations.1 But 
the deal was predicated on a fragile consensus; it de-
pended on interlocking commitments which neither side 
entered into wholeheartedly. The parties to the talks 
were not the same as the parties to the conflict. The 
mainstream seven-party alliance that represented the 
state had already allied with the Maoists to topple King 
Gyanendra who, with absolute control of the army, 
had formed the third point of a triangular conflict.2 
The November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) was not as comprehensive as its name implied.3 
It was vague on the future of the two armies and, just 
as damaging, silent on the question of militias and 
demilitarisation.4 Meanwhile, there was little in the 
way of sustained process. Inter-party committees met 
only sporadically; there were no effective mechanisms 
to monitor the many commitments that held the deal 
together. 
The process may be unique but its travails are not. 
Holding parties to commitments is a tough task in any 
post-conflict transition, especially as they perceive the 
balance of power altering in the course of a lengthy 
 
 
1 On the process so far see past Crisis Group reporting: on 
the CA election, Crisis Group Asia Report N°149, Nepal’s 
Election and Beyond, 2 April 2008 and the companion post-
election Asia Reports N°155, Nepal’s Election: A Peaceful 
Revolution? and N°156, Nepal’s New Political Landscape, 
3 July 2008; on the strains following the Maoists’ first six 
months in government Asia Report N°163, Nepal’s Falter-
ing Peace Process, 19 February 2009. Full Nepali transla-
tions of all reports and briefings from 2007 onwards are 
available at www.crisisgroup.org/nepali. 
2 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°106, Nepal’s New Alli-
ance: The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists, 28 Novem-
ber 2005. 
3 See Crisis Group Asia Report Nº126, Nepal’s Peace 
Agreement: Making it Work, 15 December 2006. 
4 See in particular Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Peace 
Agreement, op. cit., pp. 25-27: “From Arms Management to 
Demilitarisation”. 
process. As a leading expert cautions, “An important 
and frequent reason why civil war negotiations fail is 
because it is almost impossible for the combatants 
themselves to arrange credible guarantees on the terms 
of the settlement”.5 While adversaries can reach com-
promises and find mutually acceptable solutions, com-
batants “cannot credibly promise to abide by terms 
that create numerous opportunities for exploitation 
after the treaty is signed and implementation begins”.6 
The most dramatic shift in Nepal’s power equations 
came with the elections. All parties had assumed the 
Maoists would perform poorly. Instead, their strong 
showing significantly changed the political landscape.7 
The combination of the Maoists’ de facto power on the 
ground with de jure authority increased their opponents’ 
fears. At the same time, the Nepalese Army (NA) kept 
itself at full strength while confidently – if privately – 
predicting that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) capac-
ity would be rapidly degraded by desertions and lack 
of new recruitment. This critical equation lies at the 
heart of the dispute over NA recruitment, just as raw 
power calculations have encouraged otherwise unmili-
taristic individuals to look to the NA as the only credi-
ble opposition to the Maoists. 
The Maoists still feel they are the single force that de-
livered the republic, the constituent assembly (CA), 
the prospect of federalism and other dramatic changes. 
To them, the idea that Nepal would move ahead more 
easily without them in the lead seems ridiculous. 
Other parties have yet to offer evidence to controvert 
this view. For its part, the United Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist), UCPN(M), has offered too little proof 
it will genuinely forgo armed revolution in favour 
of accepting the rules of a politically pluralist game. 
Mutual recriminations and heightened suspicions have 
prompted further reconsideration of the assumptions 
that underlay the CPA. 
 
 
5 Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace (Princeton, 2001), 
p. 5. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s New Political Landscape, 
op. cit. 
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Meanwhile, both sides are talking past each other. 
There is too little communication on policy issues. 
Despite vibrant discussions in the media and occa-
sionally in the CA, Nepal’s public sphere continues to 
give the impression of being two parallel worlds. This 
is largely due to both sides’ deliberate behaviour. The 
erstwhile “mainstream” parties are still backed by 
broadly conservative power-players concerned to pro-
tect the status quo – the army, press magnates, India, 
some donors and other gatekeepers. The Maoists have 
also haughtily refused opportunities to explain them-
selves, engage in neutral forums, show understanding 
of others’ concerns and work towards a common lan-
guage – and behaviour – that could allay fears about 
their long-term intent. 
All parties are neglecting the foundations of the peo-
ple’s movement that they themselves had framed in 
November 2005: a “peaceful movement launched on the 
basis of these understandings centred on democracy, 
peace, prosperity, forward-looking social change and 
the country’s independence, sovereignty, and pride”.8 
 
 
8 Twelve-Point Agreement, November 2005, Art. 11. See 
Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s New Alliance, op. cit., p. 30. 
II. THE COLLAPSE OF CONSENSUS 
The fall of the Maoist government came abruptly and 
dramatically. Backed into a corner by their own rigid-
ity and outmanoeuvred by wily rivals, the former 
rebels pre-empted a protracted campaign to oust them 
by resigning from office on principle. The immediate 
cause was a struggle over control of the army and the 
collapse of cabinet unity. Isolated once again, the 
Maoists jumped before they were pushed. 
The end of their short-lived administration was neither 
entirely unexpected nor unforetold. Nepali Congress 
(NC) president G.P. Koirala had long predicted that 
the government would fall “like a ripe mango”; it 
would not even need to be plucked. The Maoist leader-
ship had sown many of the seeds of their own destruc-
tion. They were careless in cultivating allies, surpris-
ingly inept at working the machinery of state and 
alternately supine and reckless in pursuit of policies 
that they had failed to sell to their partners. At the 
same time, they gave no shortage of ammunition to 
those who suspected their revolutionary strategy was 
intact not only on paper but in practice. 
But before the Maoists jumped they had been pushed 
to the edge. From the start they faced dogged opposi-
tion. Spearheaded by the army and backed by power-
ful elites, the coalition of opponents was fronted by 
confrontational media commentators and second-rung 
leaders in the other major parties.9 India, never recon-
ciled to the election results but initially willing to give 
the Maoists the benefit of the doubt, started to swing 
decisively behind the anti-Maoist campaign. Before 
 
 
9 The election result significantly affected attitudes towards 
the army. Influential outlets such as Himal Khabarpatrika, 
which had been deeply suspicious of Katawal and publicly 
critical of army politicisation, changed course once the Mao-
ists started leading the government. (Before the CA election, 
this publication had challenged the army’s growing political 
clout: Kiran Nepal and J.B. Pun Magar, “Prabhav badhaun-
dai sena”, Himal Khabarpatrika, 1 August 2007.) Himal 
Khabarpatrika’s role in setting the scene for confrontation 
was particularly noteworthy, including an editorial on “mili-
tary sensitivity” using pejorative language to dismiss the 
Maoist forces as “gangs of fighters” (ladaku jattha) unwor-
thy of being called an army (“Sainik samvedanshilata”, 29 
January 2009) and the emotive but not entirely plausible 
story of General Katawal cowering in fear of his life be-
cause of threatening calls from supposed Maoist activists 
telling him to resign or face “physical action” (J.B. Pun 
Magar, “Arko utpatangko avasan”, 12 February 2009). It 
interpreted the Maoist-led government’s refusal to extend the 
term of eight brigadier-generals as an effort to reduce the 
top brass to “slaves”. J.B. Pun Magar, “Das banaune khel”, 
Himal Khabarpatrika, 29 March 2009. 
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the Maoists even decided to challenge the army chief, 
New Delhi had decided it had had enough of the ex-
periment and wanted them out. The Maoists’ choice 
of a confrontational path only helped their opponents 
achieve their aim. 
A. RIDING FOR A FALL 
It is not clear why the Maoists pushed the crisis over 
the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) to a head at the point 
they did. Tensions with the army, not unnatural given 
the brutal war they had been waging until 2006, had 
been building steadily long before the defence minis-
ter sent COAS Katawal a letter on 18 April 2009 
demanding clarification of alleged acts of insubordi-
nation. 
Compared to the lows of December-January, when re-
lations within the governing coalition were almost as 
strained as those with opposition parties, the Maoist-
led administration appeared to have gained some sta-
bility. The ordinance on inclusive recruitment to the 
civil service and police issued in January had given the 
Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) a policy achieve-
ment it was happy to embrace and claim credit for; the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) 
(UML) general convention’s election of Jhalanath 
Khanal had endorsed the leader most determined to 
pursue constructive cooperation with the UCPN(M). 
The forthcoming budget was going to offer Finance 
Minister Baburam Bhattarai an opportunity to answer 
criticisms that he had been good at raising revenue but 
hopeless at delivering real improvements. The signs 
were that he and his team had learned from their mis-
takes and were prepared to introduce more effective 
pro-poor initiatives. 
Against this backdrop, insisting on sacking the COAS 
at the cost of ending their government appears per-
verse. General Katawal had given them many reasons 
to doubt his loyalty and commitment to peace (see 
below). But he was due to retire in September and his 
private fulminations, however ill concealed, were 
unlikely to translate into a threat to the government. 
While much attention centred on the Maoists’ cultiva-
tion of his deputy, Lt.-Gen. Kul Bahadur Khadka, lev-
ering him into leadership would not have delivered the 
immediate benefits some commentators imagined.10 
 
 
10 Khadka had clearly been in discussion with the UCPN(M) 
over steps he could take to assist them. Many commentators 
allege he was willing to integrate all of the Maoists’ UN-
verified combatants and also to appoint former PLA com-
manders to senior positions. Such claims may be true but 
while Khadka could have reduced NA opposition to Maoist 
Khadka’s own desire to become chief may have been 
keen but he was no Maoist. In 2006 he had devoted 
similar effort to cultivating the Koiralas in the hope of 
leapfrogging Katawal. In any case, he alone could not 
have offered mass PLA integration or brought Maoist 
officers into command positions. 
Pressure within the wider Maoist movement to take 
action against Katawal had been growing. His firm 
stance against integration and overt political manoeu-
vring had angered PLA commanders and party leaders: 
for once, the frequently clashing peace process archi-
tect Baburam Bhattarai and dissident faction leader 
Mohan Baidya joined forces in the push to read him 
the riot act. Apart from the three cases cited in the 
demand for clarification,11 Katawal’s cultivation of the 
non-Maoist members of the Army Integration Special 
Committee’s (AISC) technical committee, which came 
to light immediately before the confrontation, added 
to Maoist frustrations.12 In the words of one senior 
leader: 
When the crisis had come to a head with the re-
cruitment issue we’d shown patience and tried to 
compromise to keep a working relationship. But 
[General Katawal] refused to play along in similar 
style and instead became more and more provoca-
tive. We had to take action or the spectre of the 
army flexing its political muscles over our and 
future governments would never have gone away.13 
If Katawal had responded in conciliatory fashion to the 
clarification demand, compromise might have been 
possible.14 It is strange that almost no commentators 
have questioned whether the NA should also be mor-
ally bound by the effort to seek consensus – let alone 
to work in line with the letter and spirit of the peace 
 
 
policies, decisions on integration still rested with the multi-
party AISC and officer posts were not in his gift. 
11 The three cases were the NA’s refusal to halt a major re-
cruitment drive, Katawal’s instruction to eight brigadier-
generals to continue work despite the government’s deci-
sion not to extend their terms and the NA’s withdrawal from 
the National Games in protest at the PLA’s participation. 
12 Some close observers argued that the NA’s efforts to in-
fluence AISC technical committee members behind the 
Maoists’ backs may have been the last straw that led to Pra-
chanda summoning Katawal to demand an explanation and 
suggest he resign. Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, 
April-May 2009. 
13 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 29 April 2009. 
14 Katawal’s combative response, in which he rejected all of 
the allegations and resorted to detailed legal arguments to 
defend his actions and question the government’s right to 
challenge him, was published in full as “Pradhansenapatiko 
spashtikaran”, Deshantar Saptahik, 26 April 2009. 
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process. Senior leader and former PLA deputy com-
mander Barshaman Pun “Ananta” said: “We had 
thought that the clarification would be “soft” and that 
we would easily be able to find a resolution accept-
able to all. But the clarification displayed such deep 
insubordination, and the Army chief, instead of trying 
to resolve the issue with the government, went to get 
the help of various political parties and diplomatic 
missions. This we felt was the incorrect thing to do”.15 
The effort to clip the army chief’s wings marked a risky 
break from the softly-softly strategy that Prachanda 
had previously adopted. Relations between Maoist 
Defence Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa and the army 
had been frosty at best.16 Neither side exerted itself to 
bridge mutual suspicions; Thapa won no trust despite 
privately lobbying internationals to maintain military 
assistance to the NA. Moreover, he signally failed to 
develop and implement plans for the army “democra-
tisation” that the Maoists argued was so essential.17 
Despite this dysfunctional relationship, Prachanda had 
built slightly more conciliatory working ties with Kata-
wal. Whatever the combination of internal pressures and 
external compulsions that forced his hand, Prachanda 
might well have preferred to let Katawal see out his 
term and retire quietly. As it was, he soon found out 
that he had bitten off more than he could chew. 
B. OUTFLANKED AND OUTGUNNED 
Many commentators have blamed the Maoists for 
bringing down their own government through arrogant 
unilateralism. The charge is not without foundation: 
many of their most controversial, and least successful, 
decisions were taken with little consultation. But this 
was not the case here. They had cabinet approval to 
seek clarification with the clear understanding that an 
inadequate response could lead to Katawal’s dismissal.18 
 
 
15 Interview, The Kathmandu Post, 5 May 2009 (interview 
taken on 1 May). 
16 For a detailed analysis of the cool relations between the 
COAS and defence minister, see Mukul Humagain, “Asahaj 
sambandh”, Nepal, 18 January 2009. 
17 The Maoists’ basic position on the future of the national 
army has been both consistent and public. See Baburam 
Bhattarai, “Senako loktantrikaran ra punarsamrachanako 
prashna”, Janadesh, 12 June 2007. It is reflected in the draft 
constitutional submissions the UCPN(M) has presented to 
the CA in 2009. The party, however, only introduced prac-
tical proposals five weeks before the fall of the government. 
Lekhnath Nyaupane, “Yasto chha nepali senalai loktantri-
karan garne sarkari yojana”, Janadisha, 30 March 2009. 
18 UML leader Jhalanath Khanal and MJF leader Upendra 
Yadav clarified in later press interviews that they had in-
deed consented to the proposed action. Even one senior In-
The unravelling of this consensus was due more to 
elementary political miscalculation than Maoist high-
handedness. 
What went wrong? First, the Maoists underestimated 
the strength of resistance that Katawal and his backers 
would put up. Second, they stalled on taking action 
and gave their opponents enough time to outmanoeu-
vre them. Both mistakes suggest the skills that had 
served them well during the conflict have dulled: they 
failed to respect their enemy and lacked decisive-
ness.19 Once the clarification letter had been delivered 
to General Katawal, UML leader Jhalanath Khanal 
and MJF leader (and foreign minister) Upendra Yadav 
departed on overseas trips. In their absence, a concerted 
counterattack gathered momentum. 
The first step was to slow the Maoists down and to 
sow doubt in public and within the parties. This was 
accomplished in style, albeit with perhaps excessive 
zeal. While the first media commentaries raised the 
stakes subtly,20 a subsequent round of rumours was more 
melodramatic. Sacking Katawal, Nepalis were warned, 
could prompt an army takeover or a collapse of the 
state.21 One unsubstantiated, sensationalist magazine 
cover story warned that the Maoists would launch their 
own coup to seize complete power under cover of a 
 
 
dian diplomat accepted that such consensus existed initially, 
while professing bafflement as to how it evaporated. Crisis 
Group interview, Kathmandu, June 2009. 
19 The initial demand for General Katawal to clarify his ac-
tions was met not only with relief in the Maoist ranks but 
with short-sighted hubris. “Army chief ambushed”, ran the 
delighted front-page headline of the UCPN(M)’s mouth-
piece. “Pradhansenapati dharapma”, Janadesh, 21 April 2009. 
Even as the plan started unravelling and the Maoists should 
have been realising that they themselves were the ones be-
ing ambushed, the same mouthpiece gave the proposed ac-
tion against Katawal an unqualified welcome. “Antatah kata-
wal karvahima”, Janadesh, 28 April 2009. 
20 One respected editor’s front-page commentary on the 
problems the Maoists were inviting, for example, played on 
both their internal pressures and the external resistance they 
would likely encounter. Sudheer Sharma, “Maovadi kina 
pachhadi saryo?”, Kantipur, 23 April 2009. 
21 The possibility of an army coup received prominent cov-
erage, starting with a front-page exposé on the supposed 
“soft coup” plan and Lt.-Gen. Khadka’s plotting to take over 
from Gen. Katawal (Sudheer Sharma, “Ke-ke bhayo senab-
hitra?”, Kantipur, 24 April 2009) and continuing with fur-
ther headline coverage of the “accident” that had been nar-
rowly averted (Sudheer Sharma, “Jhandai durghatana”, Kan-
tipur, 25 April 2009). The question of a coup’s plausibility 
and potential impact occupied one newspaper’s entire Satur-
day feature edition. “Sainik ‘ku’ sambhav chha?”, Naya Pa-
trika, 25 April 2009. 
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May Day rally.22 These stories appear to have been 
orchestrated by the army – whose psychological op-
erations unit has concentrated on pushing anti-Maoist 
propaganda into the mainstream media – and its sup-
porters in the press and political parties. 
The second step was to bring powerful international 
players into action. Most diplomatic missions were 
concerned at Katawal’s possible dismissal, more out 
of fears for stability and genuine doubts about Maoist 
ill intent than any great respect for him. But the real 
actor, as ever, was New Delhi. Mobilising India’s big 
guns was not difficult, as India had been intimately in-
volved in planning the downfall of the government.23 
Apart from the well documented flurry of meetings 
carried out by Ambassador Rakesh Sood,24 Indian 
Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee played an impor-
tant role, telephoning Jhalanath Khanal in China and 
advising him to return to Kathmandu and withdraw 
support to the Maoists.25 
The third step, and last resort, was to use the office of 
the president as a final trump card. Ideally, the pres-
sure from the first measures would have been suffi-
cient to force the Maoists to back down. When they 
pressed ahead with sacking Katawal despite the un-
ravelling of their coalition, the president was given the 
nod to step in. 
C. CONSTITUTIONAL COUP DE GRACE 
Matters came to a head on 3 May. The Maoists’ main 
coalition partner, the UML, walked out of the cabinet 
meeting when it became clear the UCPN(M) was set 
on taking action against General Katawal. The MJF 
did not leave the room, but refused to endorse the de-
cision. From their many meetings in the preceding 
days, Maoist leaders knew that going ahead would 
prompt a backlash from the president, opposition par-
ties, the army itself and powerful diplomats. Never-
theless, they not only chose to press on but did so in a 
 
 
22 J.B. Pun Magar, “Bhayanak sapana”, Himal Khabarpatri-
ka, 29 April 2009. 
23 Crisis Group interviews, Indian officials and independent 
analysts, Kathmandu, April-May 2009 and New Delhi, June 
2009. 
24 See, for example, Nepal’s biggest-selling daily’s front page 
story (Gopal Khanal, “Sudko daud-dhup”) and accompany-
ing analysis (Dinesh Wagle, “Senapati prakaranma dilliko 
chaso”), Kantipur, 2 May 2009. 
25 Crisis Group interviews, New Delhi, June 2009. 
way that gave grounds to question their constitutional 
and procedural legitimacy.26 
In constitutional terms, the Maoists’ determination to 
sack Katawal appeared to breach the requirement for 
the government to act “consistently with … political 
consensus and culture of mutual cooperation”.27 How-
ever, the charge is hard to press: the same article also 
calls for the executive to govern in consonance with 
“the aspirations of the united people’s movement”. 
This suggests all parties should remain committed to 
the November 2005 twelve-point agreement’s agenda 
of “forward-looking social change” as well as the spe-
cific promise to “democratise” the Nepalese Army.28 
Holding parties to such loosely worded declarations of 
principle requires political accountability rather than 
legalistic interpretation. The concept of “political con-
sensus” is particularly ill defined in legal terms. The 
original stipulation that it meant seven parties-Maoist 
agreement29 was deleted by the July 2008 fifth amend-
ment and no replacement definition was substituted.30 
As for the legitimacy of a majority, or single-party, 
cabinet decision, the constitution is unequivocal: this 
 
 
26 One critic of the Maoists’ decision-making style and proc-
ess has helpfully reproduced copies of the critical docu-
ments discussed in this section. Kedar Subedi, “Dastavejha-
rule pramanit garchha – ko nayak, ko khalnayak!”, Deshan-
tar Saptahik, 17 May 2009. 
27 Interim Constitution, Art. 43(1): “The conduct of business 
of the Government of Nepal shall be carried out consis-
tently with the aspirations of the united people’s movement, 
political consensus and culture of mutual cooperation. The 
common minimum programme prepared through mutual 
agreement shall be the basis of the policies of the Govern-
ment of Nepal”. 
28 The Interim Constitution took the 7 November 2006 Seven 
Parties-Maoist summit agreement as the basis of the consen-
sus agenda. This agreement’s second part specified: “The 
interim cabinet would prepare and implement the detailed 
action plan of democratisation of the Nepali Army by tak-
ing suggestions from the concerned committee of the interim 
parliament. This includes works like determination of the 
right number of the Nepali Army, prepare the democratic 
structure reflecting the national and inclusive character, and 
train them on democratic principles and human rights values”. 
29 “For the purpose of this Constitution ‘political consensus’ 
means the political consensus reached between the seven 
political parties – Nepali Congress, Communist Party of Ne-
pal (UML), Janamorcha Nepal, Nepal Sadbhavana Party 
(Anandidevi), Nepal Majdur Kisan Party, Samyukta Bam 
Morcha Nepal – and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
on 8 November 2006”. Interim Constitution, Art. 38(1). 
30 “Amendment of Article 38 of the Constitution: In Article 
38: (1) The explanation included in Sub-article (1) has been 
removed”. Fifth Amendment of the Interim Constitution, 
Art. 7. 
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is up to the government itself and is not a question for 
the courts.31 
In procedural terms, the case is more clear cut. The 
Maoists did not follow the rules. However ceremonial 
the president’s role, he is empowered to appoint the 
COAS and control the army on the advice of the cabi-
net.32 Although there is no provision for dismissing an 
army chief, the spirit of the constitution is clear.33 The 
Maoists bypassed the president, informing him of the 
cabinet decision only by telephone but sending a letter 
of dismissal direct to General Katawal, as well as 
handing a letter of appointment as acting chief to his 
number two, Lt.-Gen. Kul Bahadur Khadka.34 
This abuse of process is insignificant compared to con-
stitutional issues. It has no bearing on the validity of 
the decision itself. But it provided President Ram 
Baran Yadav the opening he needed to accept a peti-
tion from eighteen opposition parties to annul the de-
cision. The constitutional grounds for this intervention 
were shaky.35 But the practical pressures and political 
incentives were irresistible. Army sources had indi-
cated that General Katawal would have had no option 
but to stand down if his dismissal were not counter-
manded by the end of the day. If so, the putative dam-
age of passing control to a pro-Maoist successor would 
already have been done before any appeal could be 
heard. Furthermore, India had made its mind up. Reli-
able sources indicate that Pranab Mukherjee telephoned 
President Yadav soon after the sacking was announced 
and promised him full support if he reversed it. 
For both sides, questions of constitutional propriety 
came to the fore only after the real battle was over. 
The Maoists had the stronger case but they had relin-
 
 
31 “The allocation of portfolios and transaction of business 
of the Government of Nepal shall be carried out as provided 
for in rules approved by the Government of Nepal”. Interim 
Constitution, Art. 38(2) “No question shall be raised in any 
court as to whether or not rules made pursuant to clause (2) 
above have been observed”. Interim Constitution, Art. 38(3). 
32 Interim Constitution, Art. 144. 
33 The Army Act, which became law before the fourth in-
terim constitution amendment introduced the presidency, 
provided that the government of Nepal may remove the 
COAS. Army Act 2006, 11(3). 
34 The letter of appointment was not, in fact, required. If the 
post of COAS becomes vacant, the next most senior officer 
automatically becomes acting chief, without needing cabinet 
approval or presidential endorsement. Army Act 2006, 8(3). 
35 There is no constitutional provision for the president to 
reject or override a government decision, nor is there any 
provision for a direct petition from parties claiming to form 
a majority. They can, however, call a vote of no confidence 
– a step which the president’s action, and the Maoists’ 
prompt resignation, pre-empted. 
quished their ministerial seats before they made it. 
The president enforced his expanded authority and en-
joyed the flexing of political muscle that he had been 
limbering up for.36 But his intervention will cast a 
long shadow. However ridiculous the characterisation 
of President Yadav as a new autocratic monarch, the 
risks of dual power centres have been illustrated by 
recent history. The parallels with Gyanendra’s Octo-
ber 2002 dismissal of Prime Minister Deuba and Feb-
ruary 2005 royal coup are by no means exact but the 
essence is the same: the invocation of amorphous “po-
litical necessity” to act against a legitimate govern-
ment in the name of defending the constitution.37 
D. ADIEU OR AU REVOIR? 
When the Maoists launched their offensive against Gen-
eral Katawal they did not calculate that it could end in 
their own checkmate. But when they were thwarted by 
President Yadav, they recovered the wits and deci-
siveness that had deserted them in the preceding days. 
While others prepared for a messy, lengthy battle to 
force them out of government – with no certainty that 
they could be defeated in a vote of no confidence – 
Prachanda opted for surprise. The following morning 
he drafted a resignation speech; by the middle of the 
day he was on television, addressing the nation to ex-
plain that he was quitting on principle.38 
 
 
36 One civil society leader who attended a joint meeting with 
President Yadav as the crisis unfolded reported that he was 
already rehearsing the arguments to support taking an ac-
tive role and unwilling to listen to alternative views. Crisis 
Group interview, Kathmandu, May 2009. For a published 
account of the president’s comments in this meeting, see 
“Ma seremoniyal hun bhanne samvidhanma kaha lekhya 
chha?”, Naya Patrika, 29 April 2009. The newspaper simul-
taneously published a prescient editorial warning of the 
president’s “unconstitutional ambitions”. “Rashtrapatiko asam-
vaidhanik mahattvakanksha”, Naya Patrika, 29 April 2009. 
Despite becoming president, Yadav has continued interfer-
ing in local politics in his home district. Prashant Jha, “Right 
shift”, Nepali Times, 10 July 2009. His clout did not, how-
ever, assist his son, who came an embarrassing third in the 
by-election contest to fill his father’s vacated CA seat in 
April 2009. 
37 To take only one example, even most UML leaders re-
portedly viewed the president’s move as unconstitutional and 
criticised their own party’s uncritical stance. “Nepal Cabi-
net expanded; Madhesh parties mysteriously absent”, Tele-
graph Weekly, 18 June 2009. 
38 The full text of Prachanda’s resignation speech, in Nepali, 
is at www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2009/may/may04/full% 
20text-pm%20address.pdf. 
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The resignation speech was not without an element of 
self-pity. Prachanda believed he and his party had been 
hard done by, their efforts to forge consensus and 
establish civilian supremacy pulled apart by a cynical 
coalition following a script written in New Delhi.39 
Even if somewhat self-indulgent, and weak in ac-
knowledgment of the Maoists’ contribution to their 
own downfall, this analysis resonated with many ordi-
nary people. Prachanda’s defiance of India and unusu-
ally blunt criticism of its meddling won some new 
admirers. Most importantly, the Maoists’ willingness 
to quit rather than dig in for a war of attrition sug-
gested that they might yet retain a fresh approach to 
politics and be less prone to the temptations of cling-
ing to office for its own sake. The speech was far from 
a final farewell. 
 
 
39 Prachanda’s first CA speech as an opposition leader clearly 
sets out the Maoist position on civilian supremacy. Edited 
extracts were published as “Nagarik sarvocchata sthapit nab-
haesamma shanti ra samvidhan tungoma pugdaina”, Jana-
disha, 9 July 2009. One of the UCPN(M)’s leading legal 
and constitutional experts, and member of the interim con-
stitution drafting committee, has also lucidly explained the 
party’s stance: Khimlal Devkota, “Nagarik sarvocchata ra 
sainik netritva”, Naya Patrika, 22 April 2009. 
III. THE QUESTION OF MAOIST INTENT 
The biggest question is whether or not the Maoists have 
genuinely embarked on the path of peaceful politics. 
Their critics suggest that they will never change: what-
ever promises they have made are only cosmetic, de-
signed to sow confusion while they covertly pursue 
the same strategy of seizing power and establishing 
totalitarian rule. Such fears are borne out by state-
ments from some senior leaders who never embraced 
the spirit of the peace deal or recognised that their 
original approach was not going to deliver. Further-
more, the party’s official ideological stance has hardly 
altered: on paper, the people’s war is not a thing of the 
past. Its strategic offensive phase is still in progress, 
although the war is now being prosecuted by different 
tactics. 
The argument that the Maoists have not changed course 
and are using the peace process as cynical cover for 
a violent insurrection can sound compelling. Its most 
persistent exponents have made their case elegantly 
and supported it with a wealth of evidence. But it is 
wrong. However tenuous the Maoists’ devotion to plu-
ralism and the norms of liberal democracy, their move-
ment is engaged in an evolutionary process that has, 
over several years, already seen major shifts. 
The outcome of this complex, passionately contested 
process is uncertain. The party is unlikely to drop its 
theoretical commitment to revolutionary goals – a step 
that established moderate communist parties like the 
UML, or India’s Communist Party of India (Maoist) 
(CPI(M)), have also never taken. Supporters of a more 
dogmatic approach could yet win control and lead the 
movement back to confrontation. But to deny that a real 
debate is taking place requires either a wilful avoid-
ance of reality or an even deeper cynicism than that 
attributed to the UCPN(M). 
A. MAOIST RULE: MORE RAGGED  
THAN RUTHLESS 
The Maoists were not ready for government nor were 
other parties prepared to let them govern successfully. 
This fundamental problem was immediately evident in 
the four-month delay before a government was formed 
and was subsequently thrown into sharper relief. This 
twin problem led to a catch-22 situation. If the Mao-
ists failed, it proved they were indeed unfit to govern. 
If they succeeded, it proved it was indeed too danger-
ous to allow them to govern. 
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As it happened, their record was one neither of dramatic 
success nor of failure but rather a messy mixture of 
the two. Their failures were evident to all, from over-
ambition and lack of skill in setting priorities and 
using the machinery of state to achieve them to the 
poor handling of coalition politics and the crude re-
sponses to criticism. At the same time, they underes-
timated the depth and genuineness of doubts over their 
intentions and squandered opportunities to allay con-
cerns and build bridges. 
The Maoists’ repeated threats to seize state power 
(satta kabja) came back to haunt them. Their every 
move was interpreted as part of a covert plan for total 
takeover.40 The aim of exercising power was indeed 
there, as it had to be: the idea that any ruling party, let 
alone one schooled in Leninism as well as Maoism, 
would abjure power is untenable. As Maoist activists 
rightly point out, satta kabja is nothing new. Through-
out its history, Nepal’s state has been controlled by tiny 
elites concerned primarily with extracting resources 
for their own benefit.41 To the Maoists, the strident 
warnings that they might seize power stem largely from 
elites’ concern that their political and economic hegem-
ony could be weakened. As one UCPN(M) district 
secretary complained, “It’s only when we threatened 
to use power for the sake of the people that people 
started shouting. But when feudal forces had captured 
 
 
40 See, for example, Ram Sharan Mahat, “Malafide intention”, 
The Kathmandu Post, 27 April 2009; Geja Sharma Wagle, 
“Hidden agenda”, The Kathmandu Post, 24 April 2009; 
Dilip Rayamajhi, “Shades of the Third Reich”, The Kath-
mandu Post, 1 June 2009. A more measured critique was 
offered by leading NC youth activist Gagan Thapa as the 
COAS crisis reached its peak: “Maovadiko niyatma ashanka”, 
Kantipur, 1 May 2009. 
41 While the ideological underpinnings and the formal struc-
ture of the Nepalese state changed dramatically over time, 
the ability of informal elite networks to capture the state 
proved resilient. Anthropologist David Gellner character-
ises Rana rule until 1951 as running an “extractive state”, 
with heavy taxation and minimal public investment. Less 
overtly extractive, the 1960-1990 period of palace rule sig-
nificantly raised public investment under its development 
agenda. But privileged groups continued to dominate the 
bureaucracy and control most state resources. Development 
was extremely uneven, with the capital’s concentration of 
wealth and public facilities in stark contrast to stagnating or 
declining living standards in most other regions. Post-1990 
democratic administrations made some progress in address-
ing inequality but state capture, by subtly changed informal 
networks, continued, to some extent exacerbated by the pres-
sures and expense of electoral competition. David Gellner, 
“Introduction: Transformations of the Nepalese State”, in 
Gellner (ed.), Resistance and the State: Nepalese Experiences 
(New Delhi, 2003). 
state power for centuries we were expected to accept 
it in silence”.42 
However, it is fair to question whether there are not 
both qualitative and quantitative differences in the 
Maoist approach. Their ideological schooling allows 
internal debate but is intolerant of alternative world-
views. The legacy of ruthless and capricious commu-
nist regimes in other countries casts a long shadow – 
even though they have long rejected the totalitarian 
nature of the Soviet and Chinese systems.43 Their per-
ceived strength and determined strategic intent also 
sets them apart from previous governments in Nepal. 
The Ranas and Shahs were brutal but incompetent in 
their autocracy; post-1990 administrations were messy 
and short-sighted. Their efforts to consolidate and 
exercise power were simply never coherent enough to 
be threatening – and they were always counterbalanced 
by other parties and the palace. In contrast, the pros-
pect of a brutally efficient, strategically focused Mao-
ist regime backed by its own military force is indeed 
of a different order. 
In fact, however, the Maoists achieved precious little 
in the way of structural change. While established 
elites continued to fear their ruthless efficiency, ordi-
nary voters were frustrated at elementary failures to 
deliver basic goods. 
Their scope for action was extremely constrained. Their 
own coalition partners were half-hearted supporters 
at best and often actively undermined their efforts. 
Opposition parties and critics orchestrated howls of out-
rage when they attempted to take any concrete steps. 
A judiciary universally distrusted for its corruption and 
inefficiency became sacrosanct as soon as the Maoists 
spoke of reform; the enforcement of fixed retirement 




42 Crisis Group interview, western region, March 2009. 
43 For example, the rejection of Soviet and Chinese-style 
one-party systems dates back to the late 1990s and was 
formalised with the “Development of Democracy in the 
Twenty-First Century” policy. The commitment to a CA also 
evolved from a vague initial commitment to constitutional 
revision only as the Maoists first approached serious nego-
tiations in 2001. There are numerous further examples of 
strategic and tactical reconsideration taking place through 
lengthy internal discussions. See Crisis Group Report, Ne-
pal’s Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists?, op. cit. 
44 An Indian journalist was horrified that “the Maoist gov-
ernment that came to power in April 2008 has attempted to 
refashion the judiciary, and the bureaucracy has been a vic-
tim of transfers and postings”. Aditi Phadnis, “Once a revo-
lutionary …”, Business Standard, 8 May 2009. Transferring 
Nepal’s Future: In Whose Hands? 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°173, 13 August 2009 Page 9 
 
 
Nevertheless, the Maoists proved that they did not need 
any help to make bad judgments, to misread the po-
litical mood or to underestimate the difficulties of im-
plementing policies. Governing under challenging cir-
cumstances was always going to be tough. Unplanned 
as it was, their return to opposition may provide a 
welcome relief from the demands of office. 
B. THE VIDEO NASTY 
Against this backdrop, a leaked video of Prachanda 
rallying his troops in January 2008 caused a predict-
able stir. The tape, of an 80-minute address to com-
manders and combatants of the PLA’s third division, 
appeared immediately following Prachanda’s resigna-
tion.45 The choice extracts that were shown on a pri-
vate television channel before being distributed to other 
media were carefully selected to cause maximum em-
barrassment to the Maoists while obscuring the video’s 
context. In particular, Prachanda seemed to suggest 
that the Maoists had hoodwinked the United Nations 
Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) into vastly inflating the 
number of verified Maoist combatants, that their plans 
to seize power by violent means were intact, and that 
they viewed the proposed “democratisation” of the 
NA as a means to politicise it. 
Opponents seized on the video’s apparent revelations 
to argue that fears over Maoist intent were more than 
justified. However, there was no analysis of the entire 
address and hardly any serious attempts in the press to 
put it into context and assess the significance of Pra-
chanda’s comments.46 In an atmosphere of mock hys-
teria – with commentators falling over themselves to 
declare their shock at discovering the Maoists had a 
revolutionary agenda – facts were wilfully distorted 
and underlying messages ignored.47 For example, it 
has been repeatedly asserted that Prachanda admitted 
he had used government funds meant for the canton-
 
 
some civil servants does not quite equate to the Year Zero-
style genocide and re-education camps that “experts” had 
warned of. 
45 A full transcript of the address was published in one daily 
newspaper: “Yasto chha maovadi janayuddhako dirghakalin 
rananiti”, Nagarik, 6 May 2009. Extracts from Prachanda’s 
comments quoted in this section are translated from this 
transcript. 
46 There were, of course, some exceptions. For example, 
Pramod Mishra, “Reading the tapes”, The Kathmandu Post, 
13 May 2009. However, none made a detailed assessment. 
47 See, for example, Geja Sharma Wagle, “Maoist façade”, 
The Kathmandu Post, 9 May 2009; Tom Marks, “Prachan-
dagate: critical analysis”, Republica, 12 May 2009; Kanak 
Dixit, “Shakikhor manasthiti ra maovadi pravritti”, Kanti-
pur, 7 May 2009. 
ments to buy arms. The video includes some sugges-
tive innuendo but no such admission. At the same time, 
serious information on Maoist politics was down-
played. 
The UCPN(M) leadership’s response did nothing to 
encourage a sensible interpretation. Their explanations 
on combatant numbers were opaque and unconvinc-
ing; Prachanda’s point-blank dismissal of the tape as 
“irrelevant” in the changed context was arrogant and 
unenlightening.48 It was also wrong: the video helps to 
explain the evolution of Maoist policy and manage-
ment of the movement at a critical point in the peace 
process. It offers lessons that remain highly relevant. 
The context: What the edited highlights obscured, and 
the hundreds of press reports barely mentioned, was 
the extent to which Prachanda had been put on the 
spot by the PLA. As he admits, he was summoned 
against his will to give an account of the leadership’s 
line. All of his comments were in response to a highly 
critical report that the PLA has prepared off its own 
bat, based on consultation with combatants in every 
brigade. It is clear that the report was wide-ranging 
and reflected deep concerns. The fact that Prachanda 
was forced to present himself to the PLA and respond 
to the various criticisms suggests that by late 2007 the 
Maoist military had started flexing its political mus-
cles and exerting direct pressure on the leadership. This 
goes some way towards substantiating the hypothesis 
that PLA influence was a major factor in the dropping 
of the Maoists’ demand for army integration before 
the elections.49 Prachanda was at pains to reassure the 
PLA that the leadership had taken on board their con-
cerns:  
Finally, you have also raised many questions re-
garding integration. I don’t think integration will 
take place before this constituent assembly [elec-
 
 
48 “I have given countless speeches on several occasions be-
fore the CA polls”, Prachanda offered in explanation. “If 
they are aired at present, they will appear to be meaningless 
and inconsistent, considering our present commitment to 
the peace process and the drafting of the new constitution”. 
“‘Prachandagate’ tape irrelevant: PM”, The Himalayan 
Times, 6 May 2009. 
49 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, 
op. cit., p. 21: “Lack of progress on integrating PLA fight-
ers, while seen by conservative opponents of the Maoists as 
a victory, is precisely what more militant Maoist command-
ers sought. Prachanda’s shift from December 2007 (when 
he was calling for integration before the elections) to Janu-
ary 2008 (when he announced it could be deferred until af-
ter them) may look like a triumph for moderation but is in 
fact a concession to those who want the PLA to be intact on 
11 April”. 
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tion] … no understanding, no agreement, no deci-
sion has been made to carry out integration before 
the constituent assembly. It is to take place after the 
constituent assembly.50 
The question of PLA numbers: Prachanda boasts of 
deceiving UNMIN into verifying larger numbers of 
combatants than the Maoists could truthfully claim: 
How many of us really were there before the agree-
ment? Honestly speaking, there were only a few of 
us. We had reached between 7,000 and 8,000. If 
we had kept the same number, how many would 
have been left after UNMIN’s verification? 4,000. 
The verification of 7,000 would have left us with 
4,000. At least by taking 35,000 we ended up with 
20,000. This is the truth, we shouldn’t tell this to 
others. We know the truth. So why should we think 
otherwise? Our leadership exercised their wisdom 
and increased the regular army from 7,000 to 
21,000. Now you are all soldiers.51 
However, the picture is not that simple. There was a 
large PLA expansion after the October 2005 Chun-
bang meeting.52 Before then, reasonable estimates had 
placed the PLA strength towards 10,000; the then 
Royal Nepalese Army’s own estimate was 9,500 fully 
trained fighters and 25,000 militia.53 Prachanda was, 
as he admitted, responding to a strong perception in 
the PLA that the verification process had unfairly ex-
cluded genuine fighters: “Now on the face of it, it may 
look like our army has shrunk. But I don’t agree it has 
shrunk. … Where you see it as having shrunk, I see it 
as having vastly increased”.54  
Approach to the peace process: Prachanda’s inter-
pretation of the process, and of Maoist commitment to 
it, suggested a mixture of pragmatism, cynicism and 
 
 
50 Prachanda, address to PLA training meeting, Shaktikhor 
cantonment, 8 January 2008. 
51 Prachanda, address to PLA training meeting, Shaktikhor 
cantonment, 8 January 2008. 
52 This meeting resolved to expand the PLA from three to 
seven divisions. Prachanda subsequently announced that half 
of all political cadres would be transferred to military duties 
to fill the newly created vacancies. Quoted in Naya Dis-
habodh, November 2005. See Crisis Group Asia Report 
N°111, Electing Chaos,31 January 2006, pp. 8-9. 
53 Colonel Victor J.B. Rana, RNA press conference, The 
Kathmandu Post, 21 May 2005. See Crisis Group Report, 
Nepal’s Maoists, pp. 8-9. While the true numbers are very 
hard to determine with certainty, the more extreme claims are 
patently ridiculous. See, for example, “PLA’s real strength 
1,000: Oli”, ekantipur.com, 18 July 2009. 
54 Prachanda, address to PLA training meeting, Shaktikhor 
cantonment, 8 January 2008. 
revolutionary idealism. In January 2008, few political 
leaders and analysts would have bet on the elections 
taking place as planned. Despite the December 2007 
deal that brought the CPN(M) back into the govern-
ment, the atmosphere was fraught. Prachanda’s assess-
ment that “as for the constituent assembly, either the 
Congress won’t let it happen, or we won’t let it hap-
pen” is unpalatable in retrospect but was a realistic 
take on parties’ positions at the time. More remarka-
bly, Prachanda insisted that the Maoists would have 
called off the armed struggle and gone for elections 
had their call for a CA been accepted in 2001 or 2003. 
This intriguing revelation also went entirely unre-
marked on in the mainstream media. 
Political agenda and popular support: Prachanda’s 
take on the saleability of the Maoist agenda deserves 
consideration. It suggests both a genuine commitment 
to change and a shrewd appreciation of the public 
mood – as well as the useful role of conditional popu-
lar support for a purely Maoist-led revolution. To take 
one example, his words on federalism remain relevant: 
[The NC and UML] think of federal states as 
zones, whereas the Nepali people have understood 
federalism precisely as we have. For we have ex-
plained what a federation means. We have said it 
should be based on ethnicity, geography and lan-
guage. People have understood all this. But Con-
gress and UML leaders have not understood this. 
They say we’ll make zones and then we’ll make 
them autonomous. They say the regions will only be 
autonomous in geography. The Nepali people will 
not agree to this. So we’ve already won there. 
In the words of one Indian commentator, the video 
proved that the Maoists “are not really committed to 
democracy or democratic ideals but only want a 
‘democracy under our dictatorship’”.55 In fact, the 
video revealed that Prachanda had no compunction in 
threatening the continued use of force (“it’s not diffi-
cult for us to break the legs of candidates all over the 
country”) and consistently argued that participating in 
the CA elections was a continuation of the revolution 
by other means. But this was placed in the context of 
repeated reference to respecting popular desires for 
change (“anyone who tries to go back [on republican-
ism] will look like a traitor; the people will not accept 
them”) and improving relations with voters. Of course, 
the aims of revolution and building popular support 
are not incompatible. Rather, they are two sides of the 
same coin: “A revolt happens by winning the people’s 
hearts and establishing that the Maoists are right and 
only by following them can we move forward”. 
 
 
55 Aditi Phadnis, op. cit. 
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Lessons: Ultimately, the video reveals little that is en-
tirely new. The Maoists’ revolutionary goals, ambigu-
ous stance on the elections and difficulties coping 
with internal pressures were no secret at the time. Two 
lessons have emerged. 
Non-Maoists should not underestimate Prachanda’s po-
litical skills or the hard-headed calculation behind the 
Maoists’ decision to join open politics. Prachanda’s 
address to a deeply sceptical PLA was a masterclass 
in managing dissent. His approaches ranged from 
serious argument and ideological analysis to flattery, 
cajoling and stern warnings against disloyalty.56 That 
he won the day benefited all parties to the peace proc-
ess. But the way he was put on the defensive throws 
light on the core concerns of the broader Maoist move-
ment and red lines of a politically powerful PLA. 
Determination to see radical change and instinctive 
wariness of compromise are both strong. 
The Maoists need to recognise that they have only 
themselves to blame for others’ worries over their in-
tent. The video “revelations” were a crude propaganda 
campaign: deliberately leaked, selectively presented, 
misleadingly reported and tirelessly presented to sym-
pathetic audiences in India and beyond. Nevertheless, 
the campaign was successful. It reignited old concerns, 
put the Maoist leadership on the back foot and dis-
credited the UN. If the Maoists can be outmanoeuvred 
by such simple tactics their political nerve endings 
must be deadened indeed. And if they cannot offer sub-
stantive responses to the concerns raised by calls for 
revolt, they cannot be surprised if no one trusts them. 
C. THE BEGINNING OF THE END OR THE  
END OF THE BEGINNING? 
Those who argue that the Maoists should never be 
trusted have preached to a steadily more receptive au-
dience. Maoist strategy is immutable, in this view, and 
therefore the UCPN(M) can under no circumstances 
be a partner for peace or democracy. However attrac-
tive this line, it is more assertion than argument. It 
neither accounts for the sharp debates within the Mao-
ist movement nor offers an explanation for UCPN(M) 
political behaviour. It also assumes that external factors 
play no part in shaping opportunities and restraints. 
The Maoists’ internal arguments cannot credibly be dis-
 
 
56 For example, he reminded dissidents that they should think 
very carefully before going against the line agreed at the 
second national convention and made pointed reference to 
the “Alok tendency” (named for a “traitor” expelled from 
the party for dissent), underlining the party’s intolerance for 
rebellion even as it accepts a degree of debate. 
missed as window-dressing designed purely to sow 
confusion and distract from an underlying unity of 
revolutionary purpose.  
The outcome of internal discussions is uncertain.57 
And the role of external players may push the debate 
in predictable, but dangerous, directions. 
Maoist ideologues have plugged a traditional revolution-
ary line and played on fears that their party’s flexibil-
ity has turned into weakness. C.P. Gajurel “Gaurav” 
has tirelessly rallied the Maoists’ overseas supporters, 
Nepali and foreign, calling on them to remain pre-
pared for revolution.58 The Western members of the 
Maoist Revolutionary Internationalist Movement are 
probably as irrelevant as they are extreme but their re-
ceptiveness to the rebel line is revealing. For example, 
Italy’s Maoists have come out against the UCPN(M) 
leadership: 
In this context we do not support the position of 
chairman Prachanda but that of the comrades and 
leaders in the Unified Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist) that supports another line in the current 
situation, Kiran and Gaurav. We think that this line 
will become soon majority in the Party and more-
over in the Nepal revolution and among the masses 
in Nepal. We want a national and international cam-
paign with specific committees that invite comrade 
Gaurav to Italy and Europe.59 
Gajurel has also put across the same message at home, 
apparently taking particular pains to ensure the unmodi-
fied call for a people’s republic is broadcast through 
media outlets sympathetic to the NC and UML.60 The 
 
 
57 A late 2008 article by one of the main dissenting leaders 
clearly setting out the principal internal debates still serves 
as good guide to the multiple, serious policy differences. 
Netra Bikram Chand “Biplav”, “Hamro partika pramukh 
matbhedharu”, Janadisha, 22 November 2008. On the ap-
parently clear bifurcation between the leadership and the 
main internal opposition following the collapse of the gov-
ernment, see Netra Panthi, “Maovadima spashta dui dhar”, 
Naya Patrika, 24 June 2009. It should be noted that senior 
dissident leader Mohan Baidya insists there is no disagree-
ment on tactics but has pushed for a renewed strategic push 
for revolutionary struggle. “Karyanitiko barema partibhitra 
kunai vivad chhaina”, interview, Janadesh, 23 June 2009. 
58 See “Krantika lagi tayar rahana pravasilai gauravko apil”, 
Janadisha, 29 April 2009. 
59 Partito comunista maoista – Italia (Maoist Communist 
Party of Italy), declaration, July 2009. 
60 See, for example, his uncompromising message in an in-
terview to one prominent pro-NC weekly: “Das mahinama 
janaganatantra aunchha”, Ghatana ra Bichar, 8 July 2009. 
Like-minded fellow central committee members communicate 
similar messages to the UML-leaning press as well. For ex-
Nepal’s Future: In Whose Hands? 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°173, 13 August 2009 Page 12 
 
 
charismatic but erratic former Maoist Madhesi leader 
Matrika Yadav is on the warpath. His argument that 
the leadership has lost direction and abandoned its 
principles is attracting defectors to his own CPN(M).61 
This has fed the ever more harsh and public criticisms 
from other Maoists such as the U.S. Revolutionary 
Communist Party (whose grip on reality is tenuous) 
and the Indian Maoists (who are undertaking a real 
revolutionary effort and have some genuine experi-
ence and influence). Both of these parties believe the 
UCPN(M) has undergone a genuine, and to them alarm-
ing, strategic shift away from the tenets of Marxism-
Leninism-Maoism. The CPI (Maoist) has offered a 
lengthy, closely argued critique complaining that the 
UPCN(M) leadership has in effect abandoned the peo-
ple’s war and class struggle: 
Today, there is a peculiar situation in Nepal. The 
old Royal Nepal Army continues to be the bulwark 
of the present state structure in Nepal while the 
PLA is a passive onlooker. What would the Mao-
ists do if a coup is staged by the army with the in-
stigation of the reactionary comprador-feudal parties 
with the backing of Indian expansionists and US 
imperialists? Or if an Indonesia-type blood-bath of 
the Communists is organised by the reactionaries? 
How do the Maoists defend themselves when they 
have demobilised and disarmed the PLA?62 
At the same time, the boundary between the UCPN(M) 
and other parties has become more permeable than 
ever. The new cabinet contains one Maoist defector to 
the UML, Rabindra Shrestha, and it is also backed by 
a former leader of the landlord-decapitating Jhapa 
movement, C.P. Mainali.63 We should not be too taken 
 
 
ample, “Janaganatantrako tayarima chhaun”, interview with 
Haribhakta Kandel, Drishti, 30 June 2009. 
61 Matrika Yadav was quoted describing the UCPN(M) as a 
“congregation of corrupt leaders” and saying that Prachanda 
“had committed the biggest mistake of his life by appoint-
ing [M.K.] Nepal as CA member … the institutionalisation 
of the republic is a difficult proposition as long as the same 
orthodox and feudalist people remain in the government”. 
“Matrika slams UCPN (Maoist) as corrupt”, ekantipur.com, 
10 July 2009. 
62 “Open letter to CPN (Maoist)”, CPI (Maoist) politbureau, 
20 May 2009, at www.bannedthought.net/India/CPI-Maoist-
Docs/Nepal/OpenLetterToCPNM-090520.pdf. For a summary 
of the argument, see “Indian Maoists criticise Prachanda for 
betraying the revolution”, IANS, 29 June 2009. For further 
comments on Nepal by the CPI (Maoist) see www. 
bannedthought.net/India/CPI-Maoist-Docs/index.htm. 
63 The 1971 Jhapa movement, which took its inspiration from 
the Naxalite rebellion just over the border in India’s West 
Bengal state, killed eight landlords before being crushed by 
the government. Seven of its own leaders were executed 
aback: a prime mover in the regime change was erst-
while Maoist K.P. Oli – now one of the NA’s, and New 
Delhi’s, closest confidants.64 The induction of former 
Maoists is nothing new. Gyanendra’s post-coup royal 
cabinet also included an ex-Jhapali, R.K. Mainali. 
Clearly individuals’ politics are not immutable – as the 
UCPN(M) leadership’s bitter denunciation of traitors 
and revisionists shows they are well aware. Matrika 
Yadav’s “real” CPN(M) has reportedly been attracting 
mass defections.65 Some UN-verified PLA combatants 
have reportedly acted on their frustration with the 
peace process by switching allegiance.66 
There has also been movement in the other direction. 
The CPN(M) brought on board the CPN (Unity Cen-
tre) in January 2009 to form the UCPN(M).67 It has 
regularly boasted of recruiting UML activists; indeed, 
a prominent UML leader has estimated that almost 
half of the Maoists’ district secretaries were originally 
with the UML, many of them switching camps fol-
lowing the UML’s 1999 split.68 More controversially 
and counterintuitively, the Maoists have also very 
publicly embraced former royalists, including cinema 
directors and actors. This is in line with their vow to 
unite with “nationalists” – a phrase that many democ-
rats understand, with good reason, as code for erst-
while backers of the king. Some Maoist leaders are 
proud of this flexibility.69 
 
 
and others jailed. See Deepak Thapa, A Kingdom under Siege 
(Kathmandu, 2003), p. 26. 
64 On his Jhapa movement origins see Crisis Group Report, 
Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process, op. cit., p.16. 
65 One report claimed that 240 hard-core UCPN(M) activists 
had defected to Matrika Yadav’s CPN(M), citing their mother 
party’s abandonment of its revolutionary ethos and dissatis-
faction with leaders and their arguments. “240 UCPN 
(Maoist) activists join Matrika’s party”, ekantipur.com, 5 
July 2009. 
66 Reports of full-fledged defections by formed units are ex-
aggerated. Nevertheless, there is likely truth in some of the 
individual defections. See “50 PLA men join Matrika 
party”, ekantipur.com, 16 July 2009. 
67 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Faltering Peace Proc-
ess, op. cit. 
68 Pradip Nepal, “Maovadiko karkhana emale”, Drishti, 23 
June 2009. Nepal estimates that 36 of the UCPN(M)’s 75 
district secretaries came from the UML, as did some five 
dozen of their CA members. He also claims that many of those 
who abandoned the UML to join the Bamdev Gautam-led 
CPN(ML) in 1999 – whom he terms “male-maovadis” after 
the CPN(ML)’s Nepali acronym – resurfaced as Maoist 
representatives in the 2007 interim legislature. 
69 Former minister Hisila Yami, for instance, is proud that 
the UCPN(M) is not as rigid as other leftist groupings such 
as the CPN (Mashal). Hisila Yami, “Divided we fall”, The 
Kathmandu Post, 23 June 2009. 
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So far, the leadership line is holding in the face of 
critical questioning. Prachanda has insisted that a na-
tional unity government, led by the UCPN(M), is the 
best way forward – and that his party remains com-
mitted to the peace process.70 Being back in opposi-
tion may enhance unity in the short term as all fac-
tions share a common front against their sidelining 
from state power. The Maoists seem to have realised 
the risks of stepping too far out of line. They pulled 
back from an initial ratcheting up of intimidation in 
the districts following the fall of their government and 
allowed the CA to function, the government’s pro-
gram to be passed and the budget presented. This at 
least indicates an awareness that bad behaviour would 
be short-sighted and risky: some more excitable op-
ponents had been talking of using their obstruction of 
the CA as an excuse to invoke emergency powers. 
However, if the situation is not resolved in the coming 
months, pressure on the leadership will grow. For those 
looking from outside, the question will become more 
stark: to support Maoist leaders who back the peace 
process and help UCPN(M) consolidate as a non-
violent party or to push them further into a corner 
until extreme elements turn their backs on peace and 
are encouraged into confrontation. 
 
 
70 See “Maovadi rashtriya samyukta sarkarko pakshama”, Jana-
desh, 30 June 2009; and “Rashtriya sarkar nabanai sukhai 
chhaina”, interview, Saptahik Bimarsha, 3 July 2009. 
IV. THE ARMY’S GROWING  
POLITICAL ROLE 
A. WAR BY OTHER MEANS 
The Nepalese Army never embraced the peace proc-
ess. Feeling let down by Gyanendra and inadequately 
represented by the mainstream parties in the peace 
talks, its top brass reluctantly offered token assurances 
of abiding by the CPA even as they adjusted to con-
tinuing the conflict by other means. 
In this they were led by a hardened royalist who had 
never made any secret of his contempt for democratic 
values, Chief of Army Staff General Rookmangud 
Katawal. His succession as chief following the April 
2006 people’s movement had not been assured. Party 
politicians recalled his pro-palace fulminations support-
ing Gyanendra’s seizures of power.71 Human rights 
activists, including some who later urged that he be 
protected from dismissal, were so concerned at his 
wartime record as a divisional commander that they 
wrote to the UN Secretary-General asking him to in-
tervene to block his succession.72 Interim Prime Min-
 
 
71 These were published under the nom-de-plume of “Ajay 
P. Nath”. Most were unrestrained royalist polemics arguing, 
for example, in favour of “enlightened despotism” in place 
of “chaotic democracy”. Ajay P. Nath, “Democracy: is it just 
for voting right?”, The Rising Nepal, 5 September 2002. 
72 “We strongly protest the decision of the cabinet meting of 
14th August, 2006 regarding the promotion of Lieutenant 
General Rukmangat Katuwal in to the post of acting Army 
Chief of Nepal. Appointment of Mr. Katuwal is against the 
spirit of the people’s movement of 2006 as he is one of the 
key persons involved in suppressing the people movement 
in the past. Mr. Katuwal was also accused by different na-
tional human rights organisations including the National 
Human Rights Commission of Nepal and international hu-
man rights organisations for the incidences of disappear-
ances of detainees, rape of girls and killings of innocent 
people in the mid west region specially in Banke and Bar-
diya when he was the chief of the regional headquarters of 
Nepali Army, in mid western region, Nepalgunj”. “Press 
Release by Human Rights Community of Nepal protesting 
the appointment of Rukmangat Katuwal as acting Chief of 
the Army Staff”, 15 August 2006. On 4 September 2006, 
the same activists sent a letter titled “Denunciation of Ne-
pal’s acting Military Chief and Amendment of Army Act” 
to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan requesting him “to 
persuade the Nepal Government to immediately remove 
Mr. Katuwal from the position of acting Army Chief and 
guarantee that all allegations of human rights violations 
purported to have taken place under his command are thor-
oughly and impartially investigated by an independent body”. 
By early 2009, however, some of the main movers behind 
that step had shifted to urging that the army and its chief, 
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ister Koirala had been on the receiving end of his suc-
cessful efforts, alongside other senior officers, to in-
timidate the interim government into insulating the NA 
from action for its role commanding security forces 
that killed and injured protestors during the people’s 
movement.73 
A reform-minded army chief could have been a key 
player in making the peace process work, while guard-
ing against politicisation of the military. Instead, the 
NA was increasingly geared to fighting a crude propa-
ganda war against threats to its autonomy and against 
the Maoists. It rejected outright the CPA call, written 
into the interim constitution, for its democratisation 
and reduction to an appropriate peace-time size.74 It 
publicly claimed credit for cooperating with UNMIN 
while privately sowing doubts about its neutrality. 
While General Katawal railed at “Comrade Ian Mar-
tin” – for him, the former UN Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General (SRSG) was as good as a 
Maoist – his officers briefed foreign defence attachés 
that the Maoists’ suborning of embassies and UN agen-
cies was a “fait accompli”.75 
The NA spearheaded the campaign to undermine the 
Maoist government, calling for a “united front” to 
fight the Maoists, even while nominally acknowledg-
ing their post-election legitimacy. It was not only 
indulged by politicians and commentators but encour-
aged to fill the vacuum left by weak democratic par-
ties. While the NC has yet to muster coherent policies 
on most central constitutional issues, the NA produced 
lengthy documents setting out a comprehensive national 
political agenda. It called for agreed steps such as 
secularism and federalism to be tested by referendums 
 
 
the same General Katawal, be protected from Maoist inter-
ference. A public appeal, signed primarily by UML and NC 
activists and affiliates and speaking of “the need to keep the 
… national army above debate and away from party influ-
ence” was coordinated by one of the signatories to the 2006 
appeals. “Our Appeal on the Occasion of Loktantra Day: A 
statement by 19 citizens”, Kathmandu, 24 April 2009. 
73 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Peace Agreement, op. cit. 
74 “Naya samvidhan nirman garna gathit vibhinna samitiha-
ruko lagi avashyak sujhavharu”, Nepalese Army, document 
submitted to the CA, February 2009. For an outline of the 
“top secret” suggestions, see Aditya Adhikari, “A people’s 
army?”, The Kathmandu Post, 24 February 2009. 
75 The army viewed the effort to “exploit diplomatic missions/ 
UN bodies (e.g. UNOHCHR)” as an already completed part 
of the Maoist “gameplan”, whose aim is to “subvert state in-
stitutions until they become instruments of Maoist Party and 
all opposition to the Maoist Party is removed or negated”. 
“Management of integration of Maoist combatants”, NA 
briefing to defence attachés of foreign missions in Kath-
mandu, March 2009. 
and for King Prithvinarayan Shah, the founder of 
modern Nepal and symbol of the unitary state, to be 
constitutionally recognised as the emblem of national 
unity.76 
Freed from the need to report to a powerful palace, it 
has been quick to seize control of its own affairs and 
to underline its deeply conservative take on national 
affairs. In this it has had the tacit support of key inter-
national actors. India has stood firm in its determina-
tion that the army “not be touched” until the peace 
process is complete. General Katawal was granted un-
precedented prestige on a December 2007 visit, meet-
ing India’s president and foreign minister as well as 
receiving a strikingly warm public welcome. China 
has courted the Maoists but never objected to the mili-
tary-palace combine and still seeks good relations 
with the NA. 
The UK has not deviated from the position it adopted 
when inviting General Katawal for a high-profile red-
carpet visit: security sector reform is essential but the 
generals must not be upset. The U.S., privately much 
more critical of the NA’s political involvement, is 
similarly committed to maintaining the “constructive 
engagement” of military training. It has moved on from 
the days when it actively endorsed military adventur-
ism but has suffered from its own legacy of engaging 
and supporting only the “legitimate” security forces.77 
That may now be counterbalanced by tough new re-
strictions on military assistance, which demand coop-
eration with war crimes investigations and support for 
integrating Maoist combatants into the armed forces.78 
 
 
76 “Naya samvidhan …”, Nepalese Army, op. cit. 
77 See Crisis Group Briefing, Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process, 
op. cit., p. 10. 
78 “Funds appropriated by this Act under the heading ‘For-
eign Military Financing Program’ may be made available 
for assistance for Nepal if the Secretary of State certifies to 
the Committees on Appropriations that the Nepali Armed 
Forces (NAF) are – (A) cooperating fully with investiga-
tions and prosecutions by civilian judicial authorities of 
violations of internationally recognized human rights; and 
(B) working constructively to redefine the NAF’s mission, 
implement reforms including establishment of a civilian 
ministry of defense to support budget transparency and ac-
countability, and facilitate the assimilation of former rebel 
combatants into the NAF consistent with the goals of rec-
onciliation, peace and stability”. Fiscal Year 2010 Foreign 
Operations Appropriations Act, S1434, U.S. Congress, 9 
July 2009. 
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B. STATE ARMY OR ARMY STATE? 
“State is state”, General Katawal is fond of saying. By 
this he means that the Maoists can never aspire to a 
legitimacy that is the state’s alone. The army sees 
itself as having defined the nation, rather than the 
other way round. In its own words, “the history of 
Nepal, in one sense, is largely a history of the RNA”.79 
The army’s view is that it is not merely a loyal guard-
ian of Nepal’s unity and sovereignty but its progenitor 
and sole custodian. It envisages a powerful role at the 
heart of the state, formally advising on any matter 
tangentially related to national security through pow-
erful army-dominated institutions and informally ad-
vising politicians on all fundamental policy issues.80 
The NA has resisted both external control and internal 
reform. Its resistance has exacerbated the lack of po-
litical will to build functioning accountability mecha-
nisms. If politicians cross its red lines, it is quick to 
communicate its displeasure, rarely leaving room for 
misinterpretation. When Prime Minister Nepal was 
quoted as offering integration into the NA for 5,000 
Maoist combatants,81 a large group of top generals, led 
by the COAS, promptly descended on him to express 
their displeasure. (The NA later described this as a 
“regular meeting”.82) As with interim premiers Krishna 
Prasad Bhattarai in 1990 and G.P. Koirala in 2006, the 
NA does not hesitate to lean on any prime minister 
who shows signs of stepping out of line.83 
 
 
79 “RNA History”, Royal Nepalese Army, undated, p. 28, 
formerly available at www.rna.mil.np/organisation/images/ 
history.pdf (accessed October 2006). The phrase has been 
updated to remove the “Royal” and included in The Nepal-
ese Army: A force with history, ready for tomorrow (Kath-
mandu, 2008), a glossy coffee-table public relations effort. 
80 See “Naya samvidhan …”, Nepalese Army, op. cit. and 
“Nepalko rashtriya mul niti”, Nepalese Army, 2008/2009. 
81 In an interview with a reputable news outlet that he sub-
sequently claimed had misrepresented his position. “Nepal 
PM says Maoist peace process stalled”, Reuters, 25 June 
2009.  
82 “Nepal Army annoyed: PM says he was misquoted”, 
Telegraph Weekly (online), 27 June 2009. 
83 The generals who visited the prime minister’s office on 
26 June 2009 to voice their dissatisfaction reportedly in-
cluded Chhatraman Singh Gurung, Toran Bahadur Singh, 
Gaurav Shamsher Rana, Nepal Bhushan Chand, Keshav Raj 
Mahat and Anil Jung Thapa. “Nepal Army annoyed: PM says 
he was misquoted”, Telegraph Weekly (online), 27 June 2009. 
The senior commanders were also said to have pressed their 
case for a large budget increase. “Army top brass at PM’s 
door”, Himalayan News Service, 27 June 2009. 
The NA’s political clout has been facilitated by an often 
timorous, and always intimidated, media. Although 
the taboo on discussing army matters is breaking down, 
critics receive prompt and unsubtle warnings that they 
should keep their views to themselves.84 The U.S.-
funded and trained psy-ops unit, conspicuously inef-
fective during the conflict, has finally picked up mo-
mentum as a tool for monitoring open debate. It is 
most likely the source of the multiple, often near-
identical, pseudonymous letters to the media defend-
ing the army and attacking Maoists and independent 
analysts alike.85 Editors report that General Katawal’s 
personal cultivation of major advertisers offers direct 
leverage over media barons keen to protect their only 
reliable source of income.86 For all the talk of indirect 
Maoist censorship through threats, the NA has been 
shielded from criticism far more than the UCPN(M). 
As brave commentators have opened up a better in-
formed discussion, the army has resorted to increasingly 
desperate measures to scare off critics. Previously un-
known “security experts”, who reflect senior officers’ 
opinions with uncanny accuracy, have become prolific 
contributors to the press without showing any other 
signs of existing in real life.87 Army officers complain 
in private that no one speaks for them. They would 
 
 
84 An illustration of the increased public attention that is be-
ing paid to security matters are the two special supplements 
published by the Annapurna Post daily on the army’s place 
in the new constitution (10 May 2009) and questions of na-
tional security policy (5 July 2009). It is indicative, how-
ever, that the former did not explicitly discuss the NA’s 
own detailed constitutional proposals in any of its eight in-
depth pages of analysis – despite the fact that the NA’s 
views were well reflected indirectly. 
85 For example, the letters of Robin Paudyal detailed in fn. 
87 below. 
86 Crisis Group interviews, editors of English and Nepali 
language dailies, Kathmandu, July 2009. 
87 For example, “Dr Ramesh Dahal” and “Robin Paudyal” 
have offered NA headquarters-styled opinions in the pages of 
the largest-selling English-language daily. See Ramesh Da-
hal, “They are guilty too”, The Kathmandu Post, 8 March 
2008; “Autopsy on UNMIN report”, The Kathmandu Post, 
31 July 2008; “Milestone on the Maoist roadmap”, The 
Kathmandu Post, 19 March 2009; and, at the height of the 
COAS crisis, the self-explanatory “Leave the army alone”, 
The Kathmandu Post, 28 April 2009. The preferred genre of 
the peripatetic Robin Paudyal, who has moved from “Boston, 
USA” to “Germany”, is the letter to the editor. For example, 
“Erroneous deductions”, letter, The Kathmandu Post, 16 May 
2009; “Suspicious”, letter, The Kathmandu Post, 29 May 
2009; “Watchdog or lapdog”, letter, The Kathmandu Post, 10 
July 2009; “Diplomatic blunder”, letter, The Kathmandu 
Post, 24 July 2009; “Biased diplomacy”, letter, The Kath-
mandu Post, 2 August 2009. Neither Dr Dahal nor Mr Paud-
yal responded to Crisis Group communications. 
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like to have representation on the AISC and feel their 
interests and expertise have not been properly consid-
ered in discussions of national security.88 The feeling 
of injustice is sincere and deeply held. Unfortunately, 
clumsy propaganda and private lobbying are unlikely 
to address these concerns in a constructive fashion. 
Nevertheless, the army has been subject to some con-
straints on its behaviour. It has not won as great a 
budget increase as it pushed for (see below). While 
mostly successful, it has had to argue the case for en-
dorsement of its proposed officer promotions. It se-
cured promotion for its legal chief, B.A. Kumar Sharma, 
who played an important role in offering misleading 
excuses for the August 2003 Doramba massacre that 
contributed to destroying the peace talks.89 On 13 July 
the new cabinet made him a major-general and up-
graded the legal department, which has tirelessly re-
sisted any meaningful investigation of war crimes. 
The proposed elevation of Toran Bahadur Singh, the 
commander whose battalion tortured and disappeared 
dozens of suspected Maoist activists in 2003-2004, is 
on hold.90 The NA had earlier proposed Singh as a UN 
military adviser but the UN’s Department of Peace-
keeping Operations decided his record made him un-
acceptable; he remains on a U.S. blacklist. The pres-
sure the UML-led government is under is illustrated 
by their reluctance to block the promotion even of the 
officer believed responsible for the murder of one of 
their parliamentarians during the royal rule period.91 
 
 
88 These concerns extend across the political spectrum, from 
royalist and passionately anti-Maoist officers to much more 
liberal individuals. Crisis Group interviews, senior NA offi-
cers, multiple locations, 2009. 
89 When the National Human Rights Commission ques-
tioned these killings, Sharma complained that it had always 
been protective of the Maoists and that its existence would 
be threatened if it continued in such behaviour. “None 
should underestimate the army, which is an integrated and 
strong institution”, he cautioned, “otherwise the results will 
not be good”. “RNA begins probe into Doramba clash”, 
The Himalayan Times, 25 August 2003. The belligerent 
tone and content of such warnings has changed little. 
90 On the proposed promotion, see Khim Ghale, “Vivadas-
pad jarnelko badhuva sipharis”, Kantipur, 1 July 2009. On 
the delay in implementing it, see Kiran Chapagain, “Bhan-
dari suspends Maj Gen Singh’s promotion, Republica, 6 
July 2009. 
91 NA headquarters has recommended the promotion of Lt.-
Col. Babu Krishna Karki, who is accused of responsibility 
for the killing of Hem Narayan Yadav, an MP from De-
fence Minister Bhandari’s UML party. “Samsadlai birsera 
senasita hatemalo”, Jana Aastha, 8 July 2009. As a pro-
Maoist report pointed out, Katawal’s protection of Karki 
suggests contempt for a parliamentary inquiry instituted in 
May 2006 under NC MP Anand Prasad Dhungana, which 
Obliged to pay lip service to the courts, which have 
generally issued favourable rulings or obligingly sat 
on the fence, it could yet fall foul of independent-
minded judges. Its officers well understand interna-
tional norms of civilian control, albeit in comfortingly 
abstract rather than compellingly immediate terms. 
Furthermore, the NA’s distaste for the essence of the 
peace process has not prevented it from observing al-
most all of the ceasefire conditions. It has remained 
disciplined and has not made good on private threats 
of military intervention although, as the next section 
explains, it has tried to create conditions to do so. 
In short, the NA is not running amok and its command-
ers, collectively at least, are not immune to the com-
pulsions of the real world. With no political will to con-
trol it, it has stretched the culture of unaccountability 
and impunity to the limit. But its bark is worse than its 
bite. It will come to heel if there is concerted, cross-
party determination to approach state security issues 
seriously. Until then, the tail will wag the dog – and 
the generals will strive to make the next steps of 
Nepal’s development “largely a history of the NA”. 
C. STRAINING AT THE BIT 
Continued observance of CPA formalities is far from 
guaranteed. Generals have not hidden their desire for a 
decisive, “do or die” assault on the Maoists. They have 
increasingly argued that the stalemate in the insur-
gency was solely attributable to external factors rather 
than lack of army capacity: Gyanendra let them down 
with his foolhardy and underdeveloped political strat-
egy; international backers froze support just when they 
needed it most; the NA was constrained by its own de-
termination to minimise casualties and treat the Mao-
ists as “misguided brothers and sisters” rather than 
military opponents. 
Such arguments are tenuous at best. They have been 
deployed not for their accuracy but to salvage wounded 
pride and, for some, to support the argument that 
Nepal needs a “Sri Lanka solution”: an intensely bloody 
endgame in which Prachanda would play the part of 
Prabhakaran, the late leader of the Tamil Tigers. The 
Maoists appear weakened and, concentrated in can-
tonments with their weapons stored in containers, are 
tactically vulnerable; non-Maoist parties are disillu-
sioned with their broken promises; Delhi has gone cold 
on them and would like rid of the Naxalites’ comrades-
 
 
had recommended action against accused officers. Santosh 
Paudel, “Emale samsadko hatyaralai katawalko samrakshan”, 
Janadisha, 29 April 2009. 
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in-arms. But even most staunch anti-Maoists realise a 
military victory is a pipe dream. 
The retirement of General Katawal may dampen the 
push for war from the NA top brass. But the more bel-
licose elements will not be marginalised until peace is 
consolidated on the basis of unquestionably democ-
ratic values. Some in India have publicised their will-
ingness to tolerate army rule to counter Maoist en-
trenchment or disorder.92 Nepal’s own elites have 
been indulgent towards warlike rhetoric. The NA risks 
being dragged further into the political mire, while its 
soldiers risk being used in a private campaign to re-
new hostilities which would put them back on the 
frontline of an unwinnable conflict. 
D. THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE 
Generals, politicians and Indian diplomats alike fre-
quently invoke the importance of protecting the army’s 
“sanctity”.93 But the messy battle over the COAS has 
left the supposed saints looking somewhat tainted. 
The panic at the prospect of one chief passing on the 
baton to his deputy suggested the chain of command 
is not quite as “sacrosanct” as the NA would have out-
siders believe. 
“If replacing one 60-year-old Army veteran with an-
other is all it takes for the Maoists to establish a mo-
nopoly over the instruments of force in Nepal, then the 
situation there is clearly much more fragile than any-
one has ever imagined”.94 But supporters of the presi-
 
 
92 B. Raman, “Valid reasons for a military take-over in Nepal”, 
South Asia Analysis Group Paper No. 2683, 27 April 2008. 
93 The term has been used intensively by NA officers and 
their supporters in the transitional period. For example, one 
fortnightly magazine whose publisher almost invariably uses 
his regular editorial to encourage the NA to step in and save 
the country, expressed it as: “[The armed forces] must not 
be indoctrinated with any political ideology. Politicians are 
expendable, not the Nepali army. Its sanctity and impartial-
ity must be preserved at all costs. The Nepal army, we trust, 
knows well about this”. Spotlight, 24 October 2008. Gen-
eral Katawal used his speech at a function commemorating 
50 years of contributions to UN peacekeeping to insist that 
“in the name of democratisation, the army’s purity, sanctity, 
and integrity should never be compromised”. “Nepal Army: 
key promoter and defender of democracy”, excerpts of 
COAS speech, People’s Review, 3 July 2008. The NA’s 
“sanctity” is presumably referred to in Indian foreign minis-
try internal memos. It is almost unfailingly quoted by any 
Indian diplomat who touches on the topic. Crisis Group in-
terviews, Indian diplomats, Kathmandu, New Delhi and 
New York, June-July 2009. 
94 Siddharth Varadarajan, “India’s Nepal policy in disarray”, 
The Hindu, 7 May 2009. 
dent’s move argued that this one step would indeed 
have led to the collapse of the state. As one close ob-
server put it, “the president had at least twenty of the 
24 political parties in the country telling him that his 
failure to undo what Prachanda had done would lead 
to total capture of power by the Maoists”.95 An article 
jointly authored by a retired NA major-general accepts 
the Khadka conspiracy and suggests it must have in-
volved a wider group within the army: “Khadka was 
probably not alone in this hellish conspiracy and heads 
must roll”.96 
Either the NA is in a truly parlous state or exaggerated 
fears of an imminent Maoist takeover through reshuf-
fling have been deliberately been fanned to justify 
blocking Katawal’s dismissal. If his number two could 
indeed be so readily suborned it makes a mockery of 
the NA’s insistence on its discipline, professionalism 
and insulation from politics. If the second man cannot 
be trusted, public faith in the institution and in the in-
tegrity of the top command will be damaged. 
Katawal has won the battle but the NA has been 
weakened. While its supporters are energised, the 
carefully maintained charade of distance from politics 
has worn very thin. A televised video of the NA’s top 
three underlining their unity was less than fully con-
vincing. Although personal and political tensions in 
the army’s upper ranks have long been visible inter-
nally, the dirty linen has now been washed in public 
view. The army’s image has been tarnished and the 
task of Katawal’s successor has been made more dif-
ficult. Internal rifts are likely to grow. 
The many officers already concerned at their chief’s 
overly political behaviour may be more uneasy at the 
possible fallout of the latest incidents. Those who feel 
they have been passed over for promotion or training 
opportunities due to internal factionalism are more 
frustrated than ever – in particular given General Kata-
wal’s son’s felicitous securing of a coveted staff col-
lege berth amid a field of deserving candidates. This 
background, coupled with slight unease among party 
leaders and in New Delhi over Katawal’s brazen poli-
ticking, compromised his chances of a term extension 
– and could yet put paid to efforts to find him an in-
fluential berth in the president’s office.97 Ultimately, 
the army is an institution. It not only survived Gyanen-
 
 
95 Yubaraj Ghimire, “The camera hasn’t lied”, Indian Ex-
press, 7 May 2009. 
96 Shashi P.B.B. Malla, Pradip P.B. Malla and Narendra 
P.B. Malla, “Collapse of the Maoist grand strategy”, Peo-
ple’s Review, 7 May 2009. 
97 Gen. Katawal applied for one month’s leave before his 9 
September retirement in line with traditional practice. 
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dra’s downfall but thrived. Its top brass may yet col-
lectively decide they would be similarly well served 
by moving on decisively after the current chief retires. 
V. INDIA: THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK 
India had a long-term strategy for peace in Nepal. New 
Delhi was instrumental in shaping the November 2005 
twelve-point agreement and guiding developments af-
ter that. Although it never publicly acknowledged its 
role in the early negotiations that brought the Maoists 
and other parties into an alliance against the king, its 
role as facilitator and guarantor of the deal was never 
in doubt.98 At times when the process stalled, in par-
ticular in late 2007, India exerted significant diplo-
matic pressure to maintain momentum for elections, and 
to whip other international players into line.99 
But New Delhi has gone cold on its own original plan, 
preferring the short-term pursuit of immediate inter-
ests to the hard graft of supporting a complex process 
through its ups and downs. Its determination to guard 
against any reform of the security sector has remained 
undimmed, despite contradicting the CPA. Its interven-
tions have been embarrassingly undisguised, dragging 
the Indian foreign minister, foreign secretary and am-
bassador into low-level Kathmandu politicking.100 Med-
dling in Nepal’s affairs is nothing new or surprising. 
But the revised approach threatens the prospects for 
stability and, unless reconsidered, will fail to secure the 
core national interests New Delhi believes it is pursuing. 
India’s initial exertions for peace were motivated in 
large part by a confident, but mistaken, assumption that 
the elections would deliver a serious defeat to the 
Maoists – offering them just enough of a stake in mul-
tiparty politics to cement their move away from insur-
gency but leaving them little bargaining power when 
it came to negotiating the final demobilising of their 
forces. New Delhi initially adjusted gracefully to the 
reality of a decisive Maoist victory but many influen-
tial figures were deeply concerned. Second thoughts 
about the wisdom of having facilitated the UCPN(M)’s 
entry into electoral politics were exacerbated by wor-
ries at increasing Chinese influence. 
Senior Maoist leader and former finance minister Ba-
buram Bhattarai claimed that India mishandled the 
 
 
98 On India’s role in shaping and tacitly underwriting the 
twelve-point agreement, see Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s 
New Alliance, op. cit., pp. 15-16. 
99 See, for example, Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°72, Ne-
pal: Peace Postponed, 18 December 2007, pp. 12-13. 
100 This behaviour was predictable. As a Crisis Group report 
put it one year earlier: India “appears to have lost none of 
its appetite for interventionist micro-management and re-
mains happy to shield the Nepal Army (NA) from democ-
ratic reform”. Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s New Political 
Landscape, op. cit., p. 13. 
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COAS crisis because politicians were too busy with 
elections and left it to blundering bureaucrats.101 It is 
true that Indian political leaders, including ministers, 
have taken remarkably little responsibility for Nepal 
policy (see below). But diplomats have done little 
more than zealously follow instructions crafted by 
senior bureaucrats with ministerial approval. 
A. CHINESE WHISPERS 
Chinese influence is near the top of New Delhi’s con-
cerns over Nepal. It is often the first factor officials 
and analysts cite when asked to comment on the prob-
lems of the Maoist-led government. There can be no 
doubt that the Maoists’ pursuit of better relations with 
Beijing crossed India’s red lines.102 At the same time, 
there is little evidence to support the theory that either 
the Maoists or China would have sought, or achieved, 
a dramatic strategic realignment. 
A rash of stories in the Indian press a few days after 
the fall of the Maoist government suggested, on the 
basis of unidentified sources, that China had encour-
aged Prachanda to up the ante. “While India was invit-
ing popular opprobrium in Nepal trying to prevent 
Maoist Prime Minister Prachanda from sacking the 
army chief”, one report ran, “China at the same time 
sent messages to Prachanda pledging support for do-
ing just the opposite! According to sources monitoring 
events in Nepal during those crucial days, China re-
portedly told Prachanda to stick to his guns and they 
would support him”.103 
Such theories conveniently overshadowed unflattering 
headlines about Indian policy miscalculations; they 
also implied that whatever role New Delhi might have 
had in protecting Katawal was part of a larger strate-
gic battle with China. There is, however, no evidence 
that China incited the Maoists to sack the COAS, al-
though the offer for PLA officer training probably had 
been on the table. Indeed, one senior Indian diplomat 
underlined that China’s line differed little from India’s: 
“I don’t think Prachanda heard anything from [the 
Chinese ambassador] that he didn’t hear from us: I 
 
 
101 “India blundered, lost the respect it once had”, interview, 
Outlook, 18 May 2009.  
102 As one more sympathetic retired Indian official put it, 
“The way the Maoists cosied up to China makes it simply 
impossible to defend them [in Delhi]. However unfairly 
Delhi may have treated them, they just went too far”. Crisis 
Group interview, New Delhi, June 2009. 
103 “China pushed Prachanda into sacking army chief: 
Sources”, The Times of India, 9 May 2009. 
understand that he counselled caution and urged the 
prime minister to build consensus for any such step”.104 
“Maoist intentions surfaced from Day One when Pra-
chanda chose to visit China before India as his first 
foreign visit. Instead of sending a tough diplomatic 
message, India lobbied hard and ensured he visits 
India soon after”, complained one commentator, who 
viewed a proposed new bilateral cooperation treaty as 
an “all-changing peace and friendship agreement”.105 
In this view, Prachanda’s planned visit to Beijing in 
early May to sign the treaty was a reward for coopera-
tion, and in particular for cracking down on Tibetan 
refugees and protestors. The cancellation of the trip 
was therefore a victory for India: Prachanda “would 
have liked to sack the army chief and go to Beijing to 
sign the agreement; but, clearly, his calculations were 
a little off”.106 
The concern at Chinese influence is not new. As a 
former Indian intelligence officer and prolific regional 
analyst expressed it: 
China would try its best to see that the Maoists stay 
in power. Their continuance in power in Kathmandu 
is important for stability in Tibet. In the past, we 
supported Maoists thinking that Prachanda would 
take a neutral line between India and China. These 
hopes are elusive. Should we facilitate the Chinese 
designs in Nepal by bringing about a political com-
promise which would enable the Maoists to con-
tinue in power or has the time come to work for a 
non-Maoist alternative? This requires serious ex-
amination in our policy-making circles.107 
 
 
104 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, May 2009. 
105 Pranab Dhal Samanta, “Process in pieces”, Indian Ex-
press, 5 May 2009. 
106 Ibid. Such an interpretation is widely shared. Nepal “had 
taken a conscious decision to balance India’s influence with 
China’s”, observed another well placed New Delhi journal-
ist. “An unprecedented 38 Chinese delegations have visited 
Nepal over the last year. India made no secret of the fact 
that it took a dim view of the proposed visit by Prachanda 
to China last week (he quit before that ) to sign a treaty with 
that country that mimics the 1950 Treaty of Friendship be-
tween the Nepal and India, a document unique to the rela-
tionship between the two countries”. Aditi Phadnis, “Once 
a revolutionary …”, Business Standard, 8 May 2009. 
107 B. Raman, “China wants Prachanda to stay in Nepal”, 
rediff.com, 4 May 2009. In an earlier paper, the same ana-
lyst had cautioned against such a situation: “China has a 
Look South policy to counter our Look East policy. As we 
try to move Eastwards to cultivate the countries of South-
East Asia, it is trying to move southwards to outflank us. 
China is not a South Asian power, but it already has a 
growing South Asian strategic presence – in Pakistan, Sri 
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One former foreign minister observed that such fears 
were becoming a reality: “We are pouring a thousand 
crores [ten billion rupees] into Nepal. Yet China is 
more active in Nepal than we are. Prachanda feels 
quite comfortable with that”.108 In New Delhi’s views 
of China, perceptions matter as much as reality, if not 
more. Fears over Chinese influence in Nepal form part 
of a larger picture. “It’s not just about Nepal”, cau-
tioned one Indian diplomat. “It’s how it fits into a 
broader pattern of worrying behaviour”.109 India-China 
relations have become more fraught. For example, one 
article on growing tensions, centred on border dis-
putes and increased militarisation in India’s north east, 
concludes: 
For decades, India, badly bruised from its defeat at 
the hands of China, opted to back down in the face 
of Chinese intimidation. That is now changing. It is 
this newly assertive Indian posture that is bother-
ing China. Indian analysts believe that neither of 
the two countries wants to go to war. But they are 
not ruling out the possibility of China carrying out 
a limited military operation … It is to be prepared 
now that India is building its military muscle in 
Arunachal.110 




Lanka and Bangladesh. It is hoping to acquire a similar pres-
ence in Nepal with the co-operation of a Maoist-dominated 
Government. … India will find itself in Nepal in a situation 
not dissimilar to the situation in Myanmar – all the time 
having to compete with China for political influence and 
economic benefits. Till now, India almost monopolised the 
strategic playing field in Nepal. Now, there will be a second 
player in China”. B. Raman, “Rise of Maoists in Nepal: 
Implications for India”, paper presented at a seminar organ-
ised by the Asia Centre, Bangalore, 9 August 2008, at www. 
southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2802.html. 
108 K. Natwar Singh, “Neighbourhood in turmoil”, Indian 
Express, 5 May 2009. 
109 Crisis Group interview, Indian diplomat, July 2009. 
110 Sudha Ramachandran, “Indian might met with Chinese 
threats”, Asia Times, 10 July 2009. 
111 “A leading defence expert has projected that China will 
attack India by 2012 to divert the attention of its own peo-
ple from ‘unprecedented’ internal dissent, growing unem-
ployment and financial problems that are threatening the 
hold of Communists in that country. ‘China will launch an 
attack on India before 2012. There are multiple reasons for 
a desperate Beijing to teach India the final lesson, thereby 
ensuring Chinese supremacy in Asia in this century,’ Bharat 
Verma, Editor of the Indian Defence Review, has said”. 
“Nervous China may attack India by 2012: Expert”, Press 
Trust of India, 12 July 2009. 
In this context, some analysts in Kathmandu suggested 
India might have pushed the Maoists towards a crisis 
over the army precisely to thwart Prachanda’s trip to 
Beijing to sign the proposed treaty.112 Prachanda him-
self has hinted at such a theory, using an interview 
with the Indian press to say that the withdrawal of 
support to the Maoist-led government could have been 
“a planned strategy or a coincidence”: “there are forces 
that did not want the (Beijing) visit to take place. A lot 
of things were being said about the trip”.113 While ac-
knowledging the desire to conclude a friendship treaty, 
he insisted this would have had “no negative impact 
on our friendship with India” and noted the “imaginary 
fear in Indian political circles that Maoists [might] 
play the China card against India”.114 
China has, as ever, remained tight-lipped on Nepal’s 
internal politics. Its relations with the UCPN(M) – 
which it long abjured – have certainly warmed but it 
has also kept in close contact with other parties. Such 
links are by no means confined to communists. Dur-
ing the period of Maoist-led rule, senior NC and UML 
delegations were also invited to Beijing.115 Chinese 
diplomats exhibited some fondness for the royal fam-
ily; they have also enjoyed very cordial relations with 
new Foreign Minister Sujata Koirala. In all such rela-
tions China appears to reap decent rewards for very 
little outlay. It did not lavish money on the Maoist 
government (or party), just as its royalist sympathies 
led to only negligible practical assistance, be it finan-
cial or military, following the royal coup. If nothing 
else, this rate of return on cautious investments looks 
shrewd. Spendthrift New Delhi, in contrast, often loses 
the support of the very parties, politicians and local 




112 For example, one (rampantly anti-Indian but also anti-
Maoist) weekly suggested that Indian intelligence operatives 
instigated the crisis to derail the visit. “RAW mission suc-
cessful?”, People’s Review, 7 May 2009. 
113 “We’ll not bow to foreign pressure: Prachanda”, The 
Times of India, 9 May 2009. 
114 Ibid. 
115 An NC delegation, headed by Vice-President Prakash 
Man Singh, had also visited China before an official post-
election party trip to India had taken place (“After Pra-
chanda, Koirala’s party heads for China”, thaindian.com, 29 
August 2008). MJF leader Upendra Yadav visited Beijing 
in April 2009 as foreign minister (“China to increase aid: 
FM Yadav”, The Kathmandu Post, 18 April 2009). In the 
same month, UML leader Jhalanath Khanal led a party 
delegation in response to an invitation by China’s commu-
nist party for a week-long visit (“Nepal UML on a trip to 
late Chairman Mao’s land”, The Telegraph Weekly, 19 
April 2009). His own trip was cut short by the COAS crisis. 
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China’s top priority in Nepal is to stifle any Tibetan 
protests or other “anti-Chinese” activities on Nepali soil. 
On this topic, Chinese diplomats are vocal, unsubtle 
and rigidly consistent. Nepali governments of any 
political colour have little choice but to bow to their 
powerful neighbour’s primary concern; leftist parties, 
and in particular the UCPN(M), have done so assidu-
ously and sometimes enthusiastically. 
At the same time, Beijing has given India grounds for 
suspicion. The flurry of high-level visits suggested a 
much greater political interest and efforts to expand 
influence. The sight of Nepal expert Professor Wang 
Hongwei, based at Beijing’s Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies but often viewed as an informal envoy and 
policy-shaper, seated among Nepali PLA commanders 
wearing one of their combat jackets was not reassur-
ing.116 Beijing was happy to engage the Maoists on mili-
tary matters. Defence minister Thapa looked to China 
for support on integration;117 Beijing also offered non-
lethal military aid.118 It reportedly offered professional 
training to senior PLA commanders – a logical step in 
the service of integration but at odds with India and 
the NA’s refusal to contemplate any high-level officer 
entry.119 
Of course, neighbours’ assurances of non-intervention 
should always be taken with a large pinch of salt, es-
pecially as Nepal is sandwiched between such huge 
powers. Nevertheless, the evidence that China is inter-
fering or pursuing hidden agendas is most notable for 
its absence. It certainly views Nepal as lying on an 
important strategic boundary at the juncture of its and 
India’s spheres of influence but, apart from boosting 
commercial ties and establishing a number of China 
study centres, including in the Tarai, shows no signs of 
wishing to push that boundary south of the Himalayas. 
China’s long-term intentions towards Nepal are not in-
herently benign: they depend entirely on China’s per-
ceived self-interest, which could demand less friendly 
approaches. But for now, its mantra of non-interference 
in internal affairs looks close to the truth.120 “What 
 
 
116 See Bhojraj Bhat, “Chiyars! Naya nata”, Nepal, 17 June 
2007. The photograph featured on the cover of the maga-
zine, a popular weekly with a large circulation. 
117 Phanindra Dahal, “Thapa seeks Chinese help on integra-
tion”, The Kathmandu Post, 8 December 2008. 
118 “China agrees to provide non-lethal military support”, 
The Rising Nepal, 9 December 2008. 
119 Maoist leaders apparently prevailed on the PLA com-
manders to decline the offer for fear it would ignite contro-
versy. Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, July 2009. 
120 The difference with India is most striking in New York 
where China, an SC member, is almost silent on Nepal while 
India, not an SC member and vocally committed to Nepal’s 
China is doing in Nepal is to help the country achieve 
development and stability”, explained a Chinese dip-
lomat. “This is in line with China’s international role 
and the aspirations of the international community. 
We are not stopping any other country doing the same 
for Nepal”.121 
B. FEARS AND FRUSTRATIONS 
New Delhi’s desire to prevent a complete Maoist take-
over and forestall dangerously radical change has led 
it to embrace the NA, endorse its red lines and argue 
that it must remain untouched. At the same time, it in-
sists that the Maoist “course correction” it has pushed 
for must include full compliance with the UCPN(M)’s 
commitments and, preferably, a unilateral renuncia-
tion of PLA-NA integration.122 “We’re not saying the 
water in the bottle is entirely clear”, said one policy-
maker, speaking metaphorically of the NA’s purity. 
“But you won’t fix that by adding more dirt [Maoist 
combatants] to the bottle. Prachanda should prove his 
sincerity by announcing that he will drop the demand 
for integration”.123 
Indian officials are united in emphasising that they gave 
the Maoists a more than fair chance. “We didn’t stop 
them forming a government and we didn’t interfere in 
their decisions”, said one. “It’s not our fault if they 
themselves were incapable of seizing the opportunity 
to deliver anything”.124 Diplomats are quick to recall 
Prachanda’s September 2008 Delhi visit: “When he 
came here we rolled out the red carpet. We made 
promises and so did he. We fulfilled them all and he 
reneged on them all”.125 Underlying such complaints 
is a strong, widely held perception that Maoist vows 
to abandon violence and play by the rules were either 
weak or patently insincere.  
The push for good behaviour makes sense but the logic 
of expecting unilateral Maoist concessions in the face 
of intransigence from the other side is questionable. It 
depends on the Maoists being too weak and disunited 
to resist such a plan. But such an assessment is more 
wishful thinking than hard-headed analysis, as some 
 
 
independence, is tirelessly strident in its advocacy of 
Nepal’s “sovereign” views. 
121 Crisis Group interview, Chinese diplomat, Beijing, July 
2009. 
122 Crisis Group interview, senior government official, New 
Delhi, June 2009. 
123 Crisis Group interview, senior government official, New 
Delhi, June 2009. 
124 Crisis Group interview, New Delhi, June 2009. 
125 Crisis Group interview, senior government official, New 
Delhi, June 2009. 
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observers realise.126 If the Maoist transition towards 
peaceful democratic norms was halting while they 
were in power, it is likely to be even less sustained in 
opposition. 
C. DELHI’S DISARRAY 
Indian policymakers make little effort to conceal their 
grave doubts about the central predicate of the peace 
process they brokered: that the Maoists could embrace 
political pluralism and reject violence. Instead, those 
who argue that this was not the case, and never will 
be, are now getting a more serious hearing. 
India’s public pronouncements and diplomatic posture 
indicate confusion. Officials reinterpret the peace deal 
and question its tenets but neither publicly nor pri-
vately acknowledge the evident change in stance.127 
They do not seriously analyse the implications of their 
revised interventions. While frequently invoking the 
need for a Maoist “course correction”, Indian policy-
makers appear not to notice their own change of 
course or weigh its risks. 
Part of the problem is that India, like the various par-
ties in Nepal, did not do a good job of selling the 
peace process to all of its own constituencies. Most 
publicly, the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
and pro-Hindutva groups were appalled at the apparent 
facilitation of a movement aimed to topple the Hindu 
monarchy; they complained that the Congress-led gov-
ernment had “outsourced” Nepal policy to the Com-
munist Party of India (Marxist).128 Powerful players 
 
 
126 Many of those outside government who regularly follow 
Nepal developments from different political and institutional 
perspectives concur that recent developments have harmed 
India’s reputation and interests. But all complain that a 
flurry of seminars and other government hints at consulta-
tion have had no impact on policy thinking. Crisis Group 
interviews, New Delhi, June 2009. 
127 Indian ambassador Rakesh Sood questioned whether the 
CPA prescribes any form of integration of PLA combatants 
into the NA: “This idea that integration is into the army and 
rehabilitation is into society are your words, they are not 
there in the peace agreement”. “Consensus is the need of 
the hour”, interview, The Kathmandu Post, 15 June 2009. 
While the CPA does indeed not offer definitions of the 
terms integration and rehabilitation, the subsequent Agree-
ment on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and 
Armies (AMMAA) clearly specifies “possible integration 
with the security bodies after fulfilling the standard norms” 
for registered PLA combatants (AMMAA, paragraph 4.1.3). 
The AMMAA is incorporated as a schedule of the interim 
constitution. 
128 Leader of the Opposition L.K. Advani, the BJP’s prime 
ministerial candidate in India’s May 2009 general election, 
within the bureaucracy and other limbs of the state were 
also dismayed. The Indian army, already unhappy at 
the freeze on military assistance to the post-coup royal 
government, was unimpressed at the prospect of shep-
herding the Maoists into open politics and remains de-
terminedly unreconciled to the concept of integrating 
Maoist combatants into the NA. Others in the foreign 
policy and security establishment have become more 
sympathetic to these concerns. 
The excessively covert approach to the twelve-point 
agreement did not help.129 The legwork was left to in-
telligence agents and the gradual shifts in policy to-
wards the Maoists and the monarchy were never clearly 
acknowledged or explained. The rubric of “supporting 
the wishes of the Nepali people” belied, as ever, the 
intense involvement in all aspects of political develop-
ments. However, there has been little political discus-
sion in New Delhi of policies framed primarily by 
civil servants. And while major decisions were taken 
at a ministerial level, the implementation of policy and 
the revision of short-term goals has been the result of 
opaque bureaucratic manoeuvrings with little public 
questioning or political oversight. 
Indian policymakers often preface comments with 
phrases such as, “We cherish Nepal’s independence and 
sovereignty but …” In fact, New Delhi does not view 
Nepal as a fully foreign or fully sovereign country. 
However, India lacks the direct knowledge and capac-
ity that it enjoys in its own states. Its embassy is thinly 
staffed and narrowly focused; its more numerous in-
telligence operatives are spendthrift and ineffective;130 
its pool of independent expertise on Nepal, in acade-
mia or elsewhere, is dismally shallow. Despite myriad 
cross-border connections and cultural overlaps, New 
Delhi fails to benefit from its access to information. 
 
 
reportedly described the crisis over the COAS as a “natural” 
outcome of the Congress’s “opportunistic” alliance with left 
parties: “The Congress-led government has outsourced the 
problems of Nepal to the Left parties and told them to han-
dle it. The mishandling of Nepal led to the capture of power 
by Maoists”. C. Jaishankar, “Advani sees mishandling of 
foreign policy”, The Hindu, 8 May 2009. 
129 Both independent analysts and retired officials complain 
that the Indian government’s strategic shift in 2005 was nei-
ther well explained in public nor well implemented through 
the usual diplomatic means. Crisis Group interviews, New 
Delhi, June 2009. 
130 As former foreign minister Natwar Singh belatedly rec-
ognised: “Our concerned agencies … were hopelessly wrong 
about the rise of the Maoists. They were even more off the 
mark about the outcome of the elections which gave Mao-
ists a spectacular victory”. K. Natwar Singh, “Neighbour-
hood in turmoil”, Indian Express, 5 May 2009. 
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The discussion has spread beyond the mandarins’ con-
fines in South Block, which houses the foreign and 
defence ministries, as well as the prime minister’s of-
fice. Some commentators have lined up on the govern-
ment’s side to stress that concerns at Maoist intent and 
possible ramifications for India to justify New Delhi’s 
recent steps. “India has high stakes in [Nepal’s] peace 
and should engage in deft diplomacy to save it”, offered 
one editorial. “During Maoist institution-wrecking, as 
they signed the peace and friendship agreement with 
China, India preferred to remain in the sidelines. It 
must now talk to all actors, and forthrightly”.131 But 
other independent analysts suggest the problem has 
not been a shortage of talk or action but a lack of con-
sideration of ends and means.132 Prominent newspa-
pers, such as The Hindu and The Hindustan Times, at-
tacked the short-sightedness of undermining civilian 
control of Nepal’s military in favour of teaching the 
Maoists a lesson for their supposed misbehaviour. Sev-
eral commentators with knowledge of Nepal argued 
that India had betrayed its own interests. In the words 
of one: 
What is shocking is that the Kathmandu cocktail 
circuit and desperate powerseekers managed so eas-
ily to hijack India’s policy towards Nepal by talk-
ing of coups, countercoups and a civil war. What 
will be the consequences of this? First, India will 
become unpopular once again in Nepal. This may 
not be reflected in street agitations but sympathy 
will grow for a prime minister who preferred to 
quit rather than be dictated by the Indian ambassa-
dor who behaves in a vice-regal fashion. This is the 
stuff of potent nationalism.133 
D. REGAINING DIRECTION 
Indian and Nepali interests are not irreconcilable. In-
deed, they do – as diplomats always insist – largely 
overlap. But the only viable plan for pursuing them is 
to return to the logic of the twelve-point agreement. It 
has not worked out quite as planned but the underly-
ing calculation was solid: that peace, stability and 
bringing the Maoists into open, competitive politics 
would serve Indian interests as well as reflecting the 
 
 
131 “Post Prachanda”, editorial, Indian Express, 5 May 2009. 
132 Frustration at the ill-planned diplomatic manoeuvres is 
common across the board – from opposition politicians and 
activists to those who have long advised the Congress-led 
government on Nepal policy. Crisis Group interviews, New 
Delhi, June 2009. 
133 Bharat Bhushan, “India blunders in Nepal again”, Mail 
Today, 6 May 2009. 
wishes of Nepal’s people. India’s loss of faith in this 
plan is based on an unduly negative take. 
Political ownership and parliamentary scrutiny in New 
Delhi would help. For the region’s proudest democ-
racy, the paucity of serious parliamentary debate on 
Nepal is shameful. Off-the-record seminars and man-
darins’ confabulations are a poor substitute for minis-
terial accountability. Given the critical importance of 
Nepal to India, a point no Delhi diplomat ever leaves 
unstressed, there has been precious little parliamentary 
discussion of whether policies serve their purpose.134 
The rhetoric of a nationally owned process would also 
be worth translating into reality. It is true that Nepali 
politicians feed the Indian appetite for intervention by 
constantly crawling to New Delhi. Yet in recent years 
India has reacted to developments as much as shaping 
them. Accepting Nepal’s sovereignty would help India 
react more calmly and constructively when events take 
an unexpected turn – as they have before, and will again. 
The mutual mistrust and antagonism that has devel-
oped between India and the UCPN(M) is helpful to 
neither side. Just as New Delhi fears Maoist intent, 
UCPN(M) leaders harbour suspicions over India’s out-
look. Both perspectives rest on too much truth for 
comfort. Nepal’s Maoists know they have to cope with 
Indian concerns if they are to return to government 
and achieve real change but they have been slow to 
adapt in practice. Most Indian policymakers know the 
UCPN(M) is here to stay but still wish it away. In the 
meantime Nepal policy risks being overshadowed by 
India’s own burgeoning Maoist movement. The origi-
nal idea that success in Nepal would set a useful do-
mestic precedent has not outlived its utility, even if the 
situations are not directly comparable. 
Ultimately, India faces a simple choice. It can push 
for a democratic neighbour in which the Maoists will 
likely remain a leading political force. Or it can see a 
militarised Nepal, in which an emboldened NA tempts 
Maoist extremists to return to violence. For now, its 
policies are inviting the latter scenario. But it is not 
too late to revert to working towards the former. And 
India could even try to practice what it preaches to 
others on non-intervention. It might discover that Nepali 
 
 
134 Neither India’s lower nor upper house (Lok Sabha and 
Rajya Sabha) has seen substantive debate on policy towards 
Nepal since before the 2005 twelve-point agreement. Par-
liamentary discussion and formal questions to ministers have 
tended to focus more on questions of water resources, 
flooding, trade and perennial concerns about Pakistani intel-
ligence agents’ infiltration across the open border. All debate 
transcripts and parliamentary questions are archived at 
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in. 
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politicians are indeed capable of working out their 
own solutions if freed from constant interference. 
VI. THE FALLOUT FOR THE PEACE 
PROCESS 
A. NEW REGIME, OLD PROBLEMS 
The fall of the Maoist-led government was widely 
welcomed but the wave of enthusiasm for its replace-
ment, an unwieldy coalition of 22 disparate parties, dis-
sipated rapidly. It took Prime Minister Madhav Kumar 
Nepal weeks even to negotiate the entry of major 
partners into his cabinet. Smaller allies have yet to join 
and some are already showing signs of restiveness. 
The 9 July presentation of the government’s policy 
and programs prompted dissent from within the UML 
itself as well as from the NC.135 Eight parties nomi-
nally part of the coalition registered amendment mo-
tions.136 The new government lacks the will and capac-
ity to achieve anything significant, especially on the 
peace process. Even many of its constituents appear 
well aware of this, as do most of those who had ini-
tially hailed it as a saviour.137 
The new government started out – ironically if not sur-
prisingly – by flouting the very constitutional demand 
for consensus that the Maoists had been accused of 
breaching. Not only did it apparently fail to consult 
the UCPN(M) on major policies, it also managed to 
take some innovative decisions before the cabinet had 
even been formed.138 Coalition partners, especially the 
 
 
135 The policy and programs were published in full in the 
state and other media. See “Nepal sarkarko arthik varsha 
2066/67 ko niti tatha karyakram”, Gorkhapatra, 10 July 2009. 
136 Those filing amendments were: Tilak Bahadur Thapa 
Magar, CPN (ML); Chandra Bahadur Gurung, Rastriya Pra-
jatantra Party (Nepal); Jaya Prakash Gupta, Madhesi Jana-
dhikar Forum (Upendra Yadav); Sarita Giri, Nepal Sadbha-
vana Party (Anandidevi); Bishwendra Paswan, Dalit Janajati 
Party; Rukmini Chaudhary, Samyukta Loktantrik Rastriya 
Manch; Lila Nyaichyai, Nepal Workers and Peasants Party; 
Santa Bahadur Nepali, Rastriya Janamorcha. “Parties against 
govt’s policy”, The Himalayan Times, online edition, 10 
July 2009. 
137 See, for example, Kamal Dev Bhattarai, “Month-old UML-
led government fails to inspire confidence”, The Himalayan 
Times, 22 June 2009. Commentary from one repentant for-
mer supporter and dedicated anti-Maoist, calling for Madhav 
Nepal’s resignation, was particularly incisive: Manuj Chaud-
hari, “Upay: pradhanmantriko rajinama”, Nepal, 5 July 2009. 
138 The new government’s eye-catching initial decisions – in-
cluding the inauguration of a new republic monument which 
appeared to replace that already planned for the former 
royal palace, although officials explained that no budget or 
design had yet been agreed – were taken when only three 
ministers had been sworn in and the coalition cabinet had 
yet to sit. 
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smaller parties, complain of being sidelined. Impressive 
as a 22-party grouping may sound, the government’s 
majority in the CA is neither wide nor secure: in the 
only test so far, its policy and programs were backed 
by 305 members – just four over the 301 needed for a 
simple majority. 
The fact that many ministers were defeated in the CA 
elections has further tarnished the government’s de-
mocratic credentials. Madhav Nepal is an able bridge 
builder and a conscientious balancer of factions. But 
he lost from two constituencies in April 2008 and has 
yet to emerge from the shadow of his past eagerness 
to secure the prime ministership. Only twelve of 32 
ministers were elected directly, through first-past-the-
post contests. Eight lost, eight were appointed through 
proportional representation and three did not contest 
the polls at all. Several prominent office holders lost 
their seats, for example Foreign Minister Sujata Koirala, 
Defence Minister Vidya Bhandari and Peace and 
Reconstruction Minister Rakam Chemjong. This has 
caused dissatisfaction within the UML, which has been 
most egregious in appointing losers.139  
Sniping from other parties in the government has con-
tinued. Many NC leaders criticised the government’s 
policy and programs, despite the fact that they had 
heavyweight representatives, such as Ram Sharan Ma-
hat, on the drafting committee.140 While disgruntled 
leaders called on their party to register their dissent 
formally, Mahat himself awarded the government’s 
program only half marks in a newspaper survey of re-
actions.141 Similar complaints also came from senior 
figures within the UML.142 
The budget appears sensible and politically astute on 
paper. It maintains popular Maoist initiatives, despite 
dismissing the cancellation of farmers’ small loans as 
 
 
139 “If this was what we wanted to do ultimately, then why 
stage the drama of elections?” one UML lawmaker was 
quoted as having asked Madhav Nepal following the appoint-
ment of so many losing candidates as ministers. Moham-
mad Rijwan, a junior home affairs minister, is the only di-
rectly elected UML appointee, from Sarlahi-2 constituency. 
“PM under fire in UML”, Republica, 18 June 2009. 
140 See, for example, “Kangres asantushta”, Naya Patrika, 
10 July 2009; “Dissatisfaction within NC over govt policy 
programmes”, The Kathmandu Post, 10 July 2009. 
141 “Niti tatha karyakram: sarkarlai 44 nambar”, Naya Pat-
rika, 10 July 2009. 
142 At their 10 July parliamentary party meeting, UML CA 
members complained that the agenda was stale. “Govt pol-
icy programmes lack new idea: UML lawmakers”, ekanti-
pur.com, 10 July 2009. 
a “Maoist pet program”.143 It also revives some of the 
UML’s well-regarded programs from their 1994-1995 
administration, while offering projects designed to 
please Kathmandu residents alongside heavy invest-
ment in roads and basic infrastructure. But most com-
mentators are dubious when it comes to the critical 
question: can it be implemented?144 
After some stalling, the Maoists did allow the presen-
tation of the program and, later, the budget to go ahead. 
However, other parties have set a poor precedent on 
such issues. The NC’s hindering of the post-CA gov-
ernment formation and budget was egregious but dis-
rupting CA proceedings has become a standard tool 
for opposition. The CA’s functioning as legislature 
has been severely disturbed, with little business trans-
acted in its sittings. The Maoists seem likely to coop-
erate on purely peace process-related issues but will not 
offer the new regime any easy victories. A proposed 
high-level political coordination committee could at 
least coordinate efforts on this front. Long talked of, it 
is now championed by G.P. Koirala, who would like 
to head it – or at least be recognised as the “guardian” 
of the process. As long as such a mechanism does not 
meddle in day-to-day governance and sticks to a clear 
mandate it would make good sense. 
In the background, progress on constitution-writing has 
been patchy at best.145 CA members did canvas public 
opinion, albeit through lengthy and complex question-
naires that did not facilitate a wide response. But the 
drafting schedules have slipped again, forcing a further 
revision of interim deadlines.146 Only a handful of the 
 
 
143 Mukul Humagain, “Maoist pet programmes to be scrapped”, 
The Kathmandu Post, 7 July 2009. In contrast to the domi-
nant private-sector orthodoxy to which most coalition part-
ners subscribe, it even promises to go ahead with the revival 
of two state-owned industries. (These include the Hetauda 
Textile Mills, a step that might gratify the Maoist trade un-
ionists who occupied the site to protect its equipment and 
push for its revival – or annoy them at the UML trying to 
take credit. Crisis Group interviews, Maoist party and trade 
union activists, Hetauda industrial area, April 2009. 
144 Even supporters of the government are very doubtful about 
the prospects for implementation. Prominent former finance 
ministers and economics specialists Ram Sharan Mahat and 
Prakash Chandra Lohani are among the well-informed scep-
tics. They and other non-UML politicians have complained 
that the budget does not represent the coalition’s smaller 
parties. “Lawmakers see challenge in implementation of 
budget”, nepalnews.com, 14 July 2009. 
145 See Martin Chautari Policy Brief, “The Constituent 
Assembly Process”, Kathmandu, May 2009, at www. 
martinchautari.org.np/pdf/policy-brief_no.1_may2009.pdf. 
146 Despite the ever tighter schedule, the CA adjourned in-
definitely on 21 July 2009 while waiting for further input 
from thematic committees. 
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thematic committees submitted their draft proposals 
and those that did were often quirky and not supported 
unanimously.147 The important position of constitutional 
committee chair has remained vacant since Madhav 
Nepal quit it on assuming office as prime minister. 
The usually unflappable CA chair, Subash Nemwang, 
has finally altered his public line to admit that there have 
been problems, the process is behind schedule and lack 
of consensus threatens the completion of the exercise. 
There has been little joined up thinking and few parties 
have communicated a vision for the new constitution. 
Of course, this would be easier if such visions existed. 
But the major parties remain undecided on key topics. 
The NC, for example, took until July 2009 to produce 
its first internal document on possible federal structures 
– that too only a starting point for discussion rather 
than an agreed policy paper. On this most central and 
contentious area, few parties have taken a coherent pub-
lic position. As a detailed assessment observes, “the 
CPN (Maoist) is the only [political party] that has pre-
sented a comprehensive geographic model for a fed-
eral republic of Nepal”.148 For most others, the main 
incentive is a negative one: to guard against the pre-
sumed dangers of disintegration and ethnic strife.149 
B. PARTIES BEYOND PARODY 
The state of the other parties has shaped recent events 
and affects Maoist calculations. The UCPN(M) may have 
the most serious policy discussion to resolve but par-
ties facing less existential wrangles are in even more 
of a mess. Almost all are faction-ridden, rudderless and 
short on fresh ideas and leadership. This even applies 
to the UML, whose February 2009 national convention 
had held out a promising example of serious policy 
debates and full internal elections. The parties have 
been their own worst enemies, achieving only a tragic 
repetition of past mistakes.  
 
 
147 For example, proposed language in draft sections on top-
ics such as compulsory military service, the definition of 
sovereignty, the protection and regulation of borders and 
language policy often prompted dissent from within the com-
mittees themselves but was inserted by chairpersons or a 
majority of members in line with their own parties’ policies 
but without building consensus. 
148 Pitamber Sharma and Narendra Khanal, Towards a Fed-
eral Nepal: An assessment of proposed models (Kathmandu, 
2009). 
149 The rallying against the spectre of “ethnic federalism” has 
intensified. One NC-leaning weekly even argued that the 
Maoists were using the cover of “civilian supremacy and 
nationalism” precisely in order to foment ethnic war. “Naga-
rik sarvocchata ra rashtriyatako namma jatiya yuddha bhad-
kaune maovadiko yojana”, Ghatana ra Bichar, 3 June 2009. 
Most parties’ local networks are weak and have yet to 
be revived. They have lost touch with both core sup-
porters and the population at large. Instead of rectify-
ing this, they rely on looking upwards: often accu-
rately, they see power as being delivered from above 
rather from a mass base. While the palace used to be 
the chief arbiter, higher forces such as the NA and 
New Delhi remain. With the exception of Madhesi par-
ties’ strident line on regional autonomy, there remain 
few saleable policy alternatives to Maoist proposals. 
(Many governing party members have themselves com-
plained that the new administration’s policy and pro-
grams are stale.) The NC still stands out for its lack of 
thinking on policy issues: it made no detailed analysis 
of its election defeat and has only belatedly started 
discussing major constitutional questions. But its rivals 
are not as far ahead as they should be. 
The continued weakness of democratic opposition only 
encourages the army to usurp the role that should be 
played by political parties. This dangerous trend has 
gathered pace as the major parties cede responsibility. 
It is particularly surprising that NC leaders should be 
comfortable with the army producing far more serious 
constitutional suggestions than they themselves have. 
All four NC prime ministers have fallen victim to pre-
vious military interventions. Two were imprisoned fol-
lowing palace-ordered and army-executed coups: B.P. 
Koirala in 1960 and Sher Bahadur Deuba in 2005. 
Two more, Krishna Prasad Bhattarai and G.P. Koirala, 
suffered heavy-handed efforts to intimidate them in 
transitional periods.150 Former Prime Minister G.P. Koi-
rala and Home Minister Govinda Raj Joshi, a party 
strongman, were pushed into resignation by army non-
cooperation.151 Prime Minister Nepal did not have to 
wait long for his first taste of this bullying, when a 
cohort of NA top brass descended to reprove him for 
his reported comments on PLA integration.152 
 
 
150 Interim Prime Minister K.P. Bhattarai described the gen-
erals’ arm-twisting in Martin Hoftun, William Raeper and 
John Whelpton, People, Politics & Ideology (Kathmandu, 
1999), p. 301; Koirala had a similar experience in the im-
mediate aftermath of the April 2006 people’s movement 
when then COAS Pyar Jung Thapa, accompanied by senior 
officers including then Lt.-Gen. Katawal, turned up at his 
office to warn him against punishing them for their role 
supporting the royal government. 
151 Koirala’s resignation as prime minister was prompted by 
the army’s refusal to help rescue dozens of police hostages 
from Holleri, Rolpa district, in 2001; Joshi resigned when 
the army sat tight in its barracks as police were massacred 
in the Maoists’ first major attack on a district headquarters, 
in Dunai, Dolpa district, 2000. 
152 See section VII.D below on the row over the prime min-
ister’s reported, but retracted, words. 
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The main non-Maoist parties have a strong incentive 
to delay the constitution-writing process. As long as 
they remain weak, they will not push it forward as-
siduously because its completion will bring fresh elec-
tions. The evidence to date, reinforced by the April 
2009 by-elections, is that the older parties will strug-
gle to challenge Maoist dominance or to outflank new 
parties in the Madhes and elsewhere.153 The Maoists 
might not repeat their April 2008 performance but 
confident talk of their collapsing popularity is well off 
the mark. As long as their challengers show no signs 
of revival their electoral strength should not be under-
estimated. 
The main parties: 
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-
Leninist), UML: Its surfeit of bright and able leaders 
have devoted much time and effort to political analy-
sis. However, it has never been able to make the most 
of its position in between the Maoists and the NC. 
Instead of building on the centre ground and being an 
essential bridge between left and right it has slipped 
close to irrelevance. It played little role in the 2005 
negotiations that framed the peace deal. As leader of 
the new government, it risks carrying the can for an 
administration over which it will exercise only nomi-
nal control. UML leaders are well aware of the dan-
gers of such an arrangement. Their detailed January 
2009 political report pointed out the error of joining 
the 2004-2005 coalition government and the mistake 
of allowing desire for office to cloud their judgment 
in imagining Gyanendra’s “regression” was “half cor-
rected”.154 Further in the past, but still fresh in the 
memory, is the experience of their short-lived 1994-
1995 minority government. 
 
 
153 The six by-elections included a surprisingly balanced range 
of constituencies, both geographically and politically. How-
ever, they are far from nationally representative. Neverthe-
less, the Maoists’ retention of two seats and victory in one 
more suggests the CA election result was not a one-off. A 
far stronger UML and NC performance in subsequent stu-
dent elections is not much comfort: the student population 
is tiny and extremely unrepresentative of the population as 
a whole in class, caste, ethnic, gender and other aspects. 
154 The report contends that the UML allowed its opposi-
tion, G.P. Koirala’s NC, to cloud its judgment; it supported 
Deuba “without making an analysis of the overall situation”. 
CPN(UML) Central Committee, “Rajnitik prativedan”, Janu-
ary 2009, p. 91. The report accepts that this step only en-
couraged Gyanendra’s autocratic steps, split the democratic 
opposition and made it all the more difficult to achieve any 
of the UML’s stated aims – while prompting dissatisfaction 
and opposition within the party. Ibid, p. 92. 
The Maoist administration is Nepal’s second commu-
nist government to fall after only nine months in of-
fice, the first being the UML’s own minority admini-
stration in 1994-1995. This irony is not lost on UML 
leaders, nor is the fear that the new arrangement could 
break this record for brevity. Misgivings within the 
party have been barely concealed. Party president Jha-
lanath Khanal, for now outmanoeuvred by his rivals, 
has voiced concerns. Former Home Minister Bam Dev 
Gautam has been more vocal in ruing the UML’s with-
drawal of support to the Maoist-led government to 
align with the NC and more right-wing parties. Many 
senior party members fear they will be used by both the 
NC and the army. If so, they would further erode their 
popular credibility while making no gains beyond a 
few months occupying ministerial positions. 
Nepali Congress (NC): Nepal’s oldest party took a 
great step forward by finally holding a long overdue 
election for the leadership of its parliamentary party. 
The result was an unexpectedly convincing victory for 
Ram Chandra Poudel. This upset widespread expecta-
tions that G.P. Koirala would engineer a win for his 
longstanding rival Sher Bahadur Deuba – in return for 
the latter’s docile acquiescence in Sujata Koirala’s 
appointment as foreign minister and leader of the NC 
team in government. This exercise in internal democ-
racy may establish a useful precedent for a party that 
is widely – and correctly – seen as one of the most 
autocratically and opaquely managed. 
With the party presidency soon to be contested, and a 
general convention in the offing, there may be further 
realignments within the party. Deuba will seek to com-
pensate for his setback, while other contenders may 
feel emboldened now that some of Deuba’s formerly 
solid supporters have deserted him, suggesting that the 
faultline of the 2002 split has been redrawn.155 More 
internal democracy could reinvigorate the party but it 
could also destabilise its delicate balance of rival fac-
tions. None of Koirala’s possible successors is a strong 
leader, none has anywhere near his grip on the party 
and none has his ability to make bold deals with the 
Maoists or to face down the army or India. For all his 
weaknesses, the party and the country still need Koi-
rala in control. Beyond questions of leadership, the 
NC will only rebuild credibility as the prime promoter 
 
 
155 When the party split in 2002, Koirala and Deuba were 
the only individuals commanding substantial support in the 
ranks. The picture is now less clear-cut: Koirala’s domi-
nance continues but he has more contenders, who are com-
peting for influence. For a good analysis of this more com-
plex landscape, see Haribahadur Thapa and Kulchandra 
Nyaupane, “Kangresbhitra pherieko dhruvikaran”, Kanti-
pur, 23 June 2009. 
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of democracy if it forges a serious policy platform to 
translate its rhetoric of liberal pluralism into practice. 
Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF): The MJF has 
split, with the Gachchhadar-led faction opposing party 
president Upendra Yadav’s leadership and having its 
parliamentarians support the new government. The battle 
for legal control of the party is partially resolved (the 
election commission has recognised Yadav’s faction) 
but the party’s original central committee remains 
divided and there is little prospect of reunion. Yadav 
is probably in the better position to profit from this 
situation, despite his short-term loss of dominance. 
With his party shedding opportunistic senior leaders 
he may manage to revive his grassroots by continuing 
to distance himself from New Delhi and breathing life 
into a Madhesi campaign. The likelihood of a new 
political movement during the constitution-writing 
period remains high. But, as MJF and other Madhesi 
party leaders privately admit, the “one Madhes, one 
province” goal is unattainable. The crunch will come 
when the constitutional process nears the decision point 
on federalism and parties have to temper their popu-
lism with pragmatism. That is still some way off. The 
more immediate challenge will stem from demands 
for better representation of Tharus, Dalits, Muslims 
and other groups not well served by the Madhesi par-
ties in their first incarnation. 
C. UNMIN: UNLOVED BUT ESSENTIAL 
The UN mission’s mandate has been extended by a 
further six months until 22 January 2010 – the fourth 
such term extension. Once again, the government’s 
request described the consistent progress of the peace 
process and, without offering a specific promise, reas-
sured the UN Secretary-General that it is heading to-
wards its “logical conclusion” and that the CA is “duly 
working to write a new democratic constitution of 
Nepal within the stipulated time frame”.156 The mission 
 
 
156 “I have the honour to request for an extension of the du-
ration of the current mandate and the continuation of the 
related works of the United Nations Mission in Nepal 
(UNMIN) by another six months beginning 23 July 2009. 
… I have further honour to inform you that the peace proc-
ess … has consistently been making progress. The Govern-
ment and the major political parties of Nepal remain fully 
committed to take the peace process to its logical conclu-
sion and they have been keenly engaged in that direction. 
The elected Constituent Assembly is duly working to write 
a new democratic constitution of Nepal within the stipulated 
time frame”. Letter to UNSG from Ambassador Madhu Ra-
man Acharya, 7 July 2009. 
has a limited mandate and its primary responsibility is 
to monitor the management of arms and armies.157 
Under fire: UNMIN has been a convenient lightning 
rod for resentment at “outside interference” – ironi-
cally, given that it has no will or capacity to engage in 
any of the skulduggery that India does so brazenly. 
“Like elsewhere in the world, the UN peace keeping 
effort in Nepal too has failed summarily not because 
of the host country but by the erratic habits and im-
moral conducts exhibited by the men engaged in the 
said UN team”, railed one hostile editorial in a conser-
vative weekly. “Ian Martin, the former UNMIN chief, 
clearly sided with the Maoists …. It is time that the 
Nepal leadership formally says good bye to the UN-
MIN from Nepal. The longer this UN body stays in 
Nepal, the more trouble we will have to endure”.158 
Attacks have also come from political parties: in par-
ticular the NC, but also – despite UNMIN’s supposed 
partiality towards them – the Maoists.159 India has not 
only sniped from the sidelines but has sometimes 
stirred up public controversy.160 
 
 
157 UNMIN was established on 23 January 2007 with a one-
year mandate, which has subsequently been renewed four 
times. It was deployed to support the CPA by: monitoring 
the management of arms and armies, assisting in the moni-
toring of ceasefire arrangements (with human rights aspects 
to be monitored by OHCHR) and supporting the CA elec-
tions. UNMIN had planned to recruit 1,073 staff for the 
original twelve months, of which 968 were actually hired 
by April 2008. After the CA elections, its capacity was pro-
gressively scaled down. The Electoral Assistance Office was 
closed in May 2008 and all other units were reduced. By 
December 2008 it had 355 staff; this had gone down to 255 
as of July 2009. UN Secretary-General, Reports to Security 
Council, January 2007 to July 2009, available at www. 
unmin.org. For the original mandate see Crisis Group Asia 
Report N°128, Nepal’s Constitutional Process, 26 February 
2007, p. 34. 
158 “Nepal: Say Good bye to UNMIN”, editorial, Telegraph 
Weekly, 17 June 2009. 
159 The NC, in particular, seized on the Shaktikhor video to 
castigate UNMIN and demand a full reverification of Maoist 
combatants. See, for example, Umakant Chaudhari, “Mao-
vadi rananiti ra anminko bhumika”, Naya Patrika, 19 May 
2009. During the verification procedure itself, the Maoists 
had been the most vocal critics, insisting – in particular fol-
lowing the first phase of the exercise in the PLA’s first di-
vision cantonment – that the UN had unfairly disqualified 
eligible combatants. Although some cases were reconsid-
ered, only a small number passed a second test. 
160 It enjoyed and apparently stoked, for example, the con-
troversy over alleged UNMIN contacts with Madhesi armed 
groups. (There had indeed been one ill-advised and ill-
concealed meeting in Bihar conducted by the UN’s Office 
for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs on the thin 
excuse of securing cooperation in essential aid efforts.) It is 
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Weaknesses: UNMIN’s mandate was prepared within 
unavoidable, but unhelpful, constraints. It was given lim-
ited but critical tasks; at the same time it was always 
at risk of becoming stuck if the peace process did not 
conclude as planned. It cannot safely be withdrawn as 
long as the Maoist army remains in cantonments but it 
has no leverage to push for progress towards integra-
tion and rehabilitation. The inconsistency in the man-
date is the responsibility of the Nepali parties – and, 
even more so, of the Indian government, which wrote 
and continues to police the red lines. The UN itself 
took the difficult decision to accept a less than ideal 
mandate rather than risk stalling the rapid progress of 
the peace deal by holding out for unattainable perfec-
tion. UNMIN’s own public relations effort in Nepal 
did not effectively address criticisms of substance or 
working methods. It could have done more to leverage 
the public support of Kathmandu-based diplomats and 
donors, many of whom initially found their UNMIN 
counterparts uncommunicative – not to mention upset-
ting some development officials by making the pre-
tence of business as usual even less sustainable. 
Hostile environment: Initially welcomed, UNMIN 
has latterly received precious little support from influ-
ential Nepali opinion-formers. Few have taken an hon-
est, clear stance on UNMIN’s role and potential utility 
to Nepal. Some are sceptical on principle; most have 
been content to join a fashionable chorus of mudsling-
ing, which alienates no domestic players but tends to 
lack depth. Fringe outlets have been more outspoken, 
although mainstream publications have occasionally 
rivalled them for hyperbole.161 Political parties often 
play to the gallery to win public credibility or look tough 
to their own ranks despite privately appreciating the 
UN role and calling for more assistance. The NA high 
command made constant efforts to undermine UNMIN 
even as it professed its commitment to cooperation 
and participated formally in its tasks.  
Indian concerns: India knew it needed the UN but 
was worried by its presence from the outset. It has never 
coped well with these dual compulsions. It rushed to 
help UNMIN get set up, with a genuine effort and 
major contribution on practicalities such as providing 
vehicles and containers for arms which would have 
 
 
ironic that the government of India had itself been directly 
supporting the same armed insurgents that it complained of 
the UN engaging with on humanitarian issues. Crisis Group 
interviews, officials and analysts, New Delhi, September 2008.  
161 See, for example, the call of one mainstream daily for 
the UNMIN chief to be sacked over the phrasing of one 
(not inaccurate) sentence in the May 2009 UN Secretary-
General’s report. “Recall Landgren”, editorial, Republica, 
27 May 2009. 
taken months to arrive via other routes. But almost at the 
same time it started the off-the-record sniping, much 
of it at the pettiest level.162 The approach was predi-
cated on the confident calculation that a few weeks 
after the CA elections the new, “legitimate” govern-
ment would thank UNMIN for its troubles and order it 
to pack its bags. It also reflected a genuine fear that a 
serious international presence, even with a limited 
mandate, might reduce India’s almost unfettered in-
fluence on Nepal and dilute its exclusive role in the 
peace process. This could be a blow not just to India’s 
dignity but also to its scope for intervention. 
Resentment at new approaches: UNMIN upset dif-
ferent layers of the establishment by taking marginal-
ised communities seriously. It risked alienating the 
traditional UN employee class – a well-entrenched net-
work – by making a real effort towards inclusive em-
ployment practices. In doing so, it built probably the 
most diverse workforce of any comparable international 
or national agency, putting donors and Nepal’s govern-
ment to shame. The contrast with the high-caste male 
cliques dominating the parties and the media was even 
more stark. It is little wonder UNMIN earned minimal 
public credit for this, or even interest. UNMIN was by 
its nature closely in contact with the Maoists, particu-
larly the PLA, through arms monitoring and the Joint 
Monitoring Coordination Committee (JMCC). It natu-
rally developed a different perspective on them, one 
based on far more in-depth, face-to-face relations than 
most outsiders. It was a small step to translate this into 
accusations of bias. 
In sum, UNMIN perhaps started out with a flawed man-
date. But that was hard to avoid and the decision to 
accept it is, even with the benefit of hindsight, justifi-
able. It is hard to imagine what readily better options 
existed or could have been engineered. Its poor public 
relations were exacerbated by half-hearted diplomatic 
and political support. A natural scapegoat, it should 
have developed better strategies to deal with public 
criticism. But it has played an essential role, many as-
pects of which have been unsung and underappreci-
ated.163 Without it, the peace process could well have 
 
 
162 “They realise Nepal’s a cushy spot and just want to ex-
tend their stay indefinitely to enjoy themselves and keep 
their cars and salaries” was a repeated refrain, even from 
the most dedicated and committed of diplomats. Crisis Group 
interviews, various Indian officials, Kathmandu and New 
Delhi, 2007-2008. (Of course, the cars and salaries were 
indeed embarrassingly luxurious, although this is a trend that 
Kathmandu’s omnipresent aid experts, and Indian ambassa-
dors, have done little to buck.) 
163 For a relatively uncontroversial example, there were the 
district election advisers who boosted many election commis-
sion officers’ morale and capacity in districts nationwide in 
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collapsed and Nepal’s politicians – of all stripes – 
would have had even less of a shield against deter-
mined but miscalculated bilateral meddling.164 
A UN role in Nepal is here to stay – and certainly be-
yond January 2010. UNMIN has not been used as well 
as it could, either for technical input or for political 
backing for the peace process. An expanded mandate 
is unlikely and unnecessary: some technical assistance 
is happening under the current set-up and the offer of 
the Secretary-General’s good offices does not depend 
on a formal sanction. India does not want extended 
Security Council (SC) attention on its backyard; China 
does not feel much differently. But as long as UNMIN 
is there, SC oversight is inevitable, as are the growing 
concerns of member states at slow progress and the 
multiple missed deadlines. Their engagement can be 
useful, and Russia’s longstanding proposal of an SC 
visit to Nepal merits serious consideration.165 
Repeated extensions to UNMIN’s mandate are not dis-
astrous in themselves, even if they are slightly embar-
rassing. The bigger question is how to make the most 
of international moral and practical support while be-
ing honest about the challenges. Such honesty would 
help in planning better to address difficulties in a long-
term fashion, not just with the six-month pretence that 
comes round each January and July. It should also 
embrace a realistic understanding of Indian and Chi-
nese concerns – not to mention the genuine desire of 
most Nepalis not to become dependent on white cars 
or blue helmets. But even once UNMIN has gone, 
Nepal’s transition to full stability will be a lengthy, 
delicate process requiring international understanding 
beyond the standard development engagement. It is 
already time to be thinking about the transition to co-
ordinated support for that next stage, whether through 
a strengthened UN country team, better international co-
ordination mechanisms or any other means. Ideally, 
Nepal itself should guide such steps and its powerful 
neighbours should take the lead in bringing interna-
 
 
the run-up to the CA election. See Crisis Group Report, A 
Peaceful Revolution?, op. cit., p. 9. It is important to note 
that India supported such efforts wholeheartedly: its criti-
cism of the UN role was not unfocused. 
164 Some serious analysts who would prefer not to say so in 
print are convinced that UNMIN’s presence has been a 
critical bar against resumed conflict. One senior newspaper 
editor, for example, says: “If it weren’t for UNMIN we’d 
have been back at war long ago; there’s no way the peace 
process would not have collapsed”. Crisis Group interview, 
Kathmandu, July 2009. 
165 The Security Council has undertaken a number of visits 
to countries in which it has mandated missions. Reports of 
missions are at www.un.org/Docs/sc/missionreports.html. 
tional players back onto the same page for the region’s 
long-term good. 
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VII. HEADING OFF TROUBLE:  
SOME SUGGESTIONS 
The risks to the peace process posed by polarisation 
and the individual actors’ mala fide intentions are clear. 
But Nepal’s transition is conditioned just as much, if 
not more, by deeper and broader social, economic and 
cultural change. Great as the influence of top party 
leaders can be, the country’s transformation is not solely 
in their hands. A young and growing population is 
caught between aspiration and frustration; marginal-
ised groups continue to agitate for greater representation; 
faith in the state and political processes has not evapo-
rated but is conditional. With so much contestation and 
conflict, the structural challenges involved in achieving 
a lasting resolution should not be underestimated. Cou-
pled with this is the need to reimagine the bases of na-
tional identity. Nepal is not the Balkans: the assertion 
of ethnic and regional identity does not necessarily 
mean secessionism and communalism. But forging a 
revised national self-image only adds to the tasks the 
political process has to channel constructively. Mud-
dling through – the traditional fallback approach – has 
staved off catastrophe in the past but is a less than in-
spiring strategy which is already offering diminishing 
returns. 
A. COPE WITH CHANGE ON ALL FRONTS 
Nepal is a large country, and a changing one. The peace 
process had its roots in a comparatively straightforward 
triangular conflict. The main parties, readily identifi-
able, were structured and fairly predictable in their be-
haviour. They were able to fight and to talk; when they 
chose, they had it in their hands to create chaos or sta-
bility. Things are not so simple now. Short-term closed-
door fixes still work, but their efficacy is ever less du-
rable and they have made politics more dysfunctional 
overall. Games of musical chairs in Kathmandu are not 
going to solve Nepal’s multiple, pressing problems. 
Parties need to get a grip and put their own disputes 
into perspective. If not, they will be standing on the 
sidelines as wider forces reshape the country in ways 
beyond their control. 
The concepts of fragile, failing or failed states are not 
necessarily helpful or applicable. But Nepal’s slide down 
the rankings of the respected Fragile States Index should 
prompt concern.166 Coupled with weak public security 
 
 
166 Nepal ranked 25th in the Fund for Peace/Foreign Policy 
Failed States Index, placing it in the highest risk category 
(discussed below), the country’s fragility adds to the dif-
ficulties of finding peace solutions and putting them 
into practice. State institutions are, in general, ineffec-
tive in their functioning and command little public 
trust. Perceptions of corruption and politicisation of the 
police and judiciary are particularly damaging to con-
fidence and public security. 
Inequality and conflict: Nepal is a deeply unequal 
country. It has the greatest levels of inequality in South 
Asia – and the gaps are growing wider.167 Such differ-
entials tend to hinder smooth democratisation and in-
crease the risks of totalitarianism. The peace process 
was predicated on a cross-class consensus for democ-
ratic structures. Yet the institutionalisation of democ-
racy is conditioned by the evolving struggle between 
groups that hold power and those that are excluded 
from it. Great inequality increases the incentives for 
the powerless to fight for a share of the pie but it also 
raises the stakes for existing elites: the more they 
stand to lose, the harder they will resist change.168 The 
definition of Nepal’s “elites” is not straightforward 
but a struggle for control of state institutions, which 
involves forms of class conflict, is undeniably taking 
place. If power is redistributed there will be losers, at 
least in the short term. The interests of different classes, 
castes and other communities will inevitably clash. 
Without agreement on how to negotiate such conflicts, 
this is a recipe for turbulence and violence. 
Land reform: Land disputes are a running sore. Land-
lessness is a particularly acute example of inequality 
and unsustainable social divisions. Yet progress on land 
reform has been stalled, despite many cross-party com-
mitments. The new government has promised that “all 
legitimate demands put forward by … the landless … 
will be gradually fulfilled through mutual dialogue”.169 
 
 
and marking a deterioration in both its relative position and 
individual indicators since 2008. See www.fundforpeace.org. 
167 One Nepali academic recently pointed out that the Gini 
measure of economic inequality increased from 0.305 in the 
1980s to 0.472 in 2000-03: “in a South Asian context, ine-
quality in Nepal was less than India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka 
in the 1980s while it became the highest among the above 
three countries and Bangladesh in the 1990s and the early 
twenty-first century. … Gini index never crossed 0.4 in the 
four countries”. Mahendra Lawoti, “Democratic corpora-
tism”, The Kathmandu Post, 5 February 2009. 
168 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Ori-
gins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge, 2005). 
169 The full list reads: “All legitimate demands put forward 
by the workers, peasants, women, youths, students, teachers, 
professors, intellectuals, doctors, engineers, lawyers, civil ser-
vants, journalists, entrepreneurs, cultural artists, the land-
less, the squatters, the conflict-affected, the displaced, freed 
bonded labourers (Kamaiyas), the Haliyas, Badis, and the 
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Landless people, however, are only one of 23 catego-
ries of people whose demands will be addressed; prompt 
steps are unlikely. The government has also promised 
that a scientific land reforms program will be imple-
mented and that “special attention will be paid to the 
socio-economic uplifting of the agriculture labour, 
freed bonded labour, landless and squatters”.170 It has 
further vowed to reclaim land as part of two major 
irrigation river diversion projects.171 Land reform has 
long been one of the Maoists’ central goals and a sig-
nificant mobilising agenda. The fact that they made 
almost no progress in this area while in government, 
despite establishing a commission, suggests it will be 
hard to address. 
Education, employment and economic growth: The 
2009 school leaving certificate results brought good 
news for many students: the two-thirds pass rate was a 
significant increase on previous years. However, the 
higher education system cannot absorb all those want-
ing to pursue further studies while the job market has 
extremely limited openings for those with better quali-
fications. Industrial production has dropped and eco-
nomic growth is likely to fall by more than two per-
centage points.172 At the same time, inflation has been 
in double digits for several months. Although the global 
economic slowdown has not yet affected remittances 
as badly as many predicted, prospects for economic 
growth and employment are grim.173 Agriculture, which 
remains the backbone of the economy, can offer only 
marginal increases in efficiency and productivity – and 
that too only with improved credit and investment, not 
to mention favourable weather. Industry, troubled by 
lack of diversification and poor labour relations, is not 
likely to deliver much in the way of jobs or profits. 
The already large numbers of unemployed and disaf-
fected young people look set to grow. And in the short 
term, Nepal’s chronic food deficit has become an acute 
 
 
disabled will be gradually fulfilled through mutual dialogue”. 
Policies and Programmes of the Government of Nepal for 
the Fiscal Year 2066/067, para. 18. 
170 Ibid, para. 31. 
171 Ibid, para. 34. 
172 “Quarterly economic update Nepal”, Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), June 2009. The ADB does forecast a marginal 
improvement in growth in 2010, but only to a meagre 3.5 
per cent. “Asian Development Outlook Nepal”, ADB, 2009. 
Still, these figures are not necessarily disastrous. During the 
decade of insurgency, Nepal managed modest but sustained 
growth and significant poverty reduction. “Nepal: resilience 
amidst conflict”, World Bank, June 2006. A major factor 
behind this development was remittances, but rising in-
comes from agricultural activities and industrial employ-
ment also played important roles. 
173 “Interim Strategy Note for Nepal for the period FY 
2010-2011”, World Bank, May 2009. 
crisis, with food shortages threatening dozens of dis-
tricts and adding to the stresses on under-resourced 
communities. 
New armed actors: The complexity of the political 
landscape, and profusion of small disruptive outfits, 
has continued to increase. One report listed twelve 
active armed groups in the Tarai, of whom five have 
entered preliminary talks with the government; it also 
names six armed groups mobilised in the eastern hills, 
of which only one is in negotiations.174 Government 
strategy towards such groups remains unclear. The 
Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) has 
reportedly initiated contacts by telephone with the 
promise of substantive dialogue with the peace minis-
ter.175 But the terms for talks, and their goals, have been 
neither clearly defined nor seriously pursued. With a 
limping constitutional process, divided political scene 
and incompetent law and order enforcement, the in-
centives for new groups to emerge and stake a claim 
to attention and rewards is undiminished.176 
B. STRENGTHEN THE STATE’S CAPACITY 
AND LEGITIMACY 
The state has not failed. However, it lacks capacity and 
legitimacy. It has failed to get a grip on insecurity and 
has itself been responsible for killing more of its own 
citizens than any other group.177 
Public security, justice and impunity: Focusing solely 
on the Maoists as instigators of unrest is unhelpful. 
Other parties are not nearly as non-violent as they pre-
tend; some fringe groups make no claims to peaceful 
methods and have been increasingly active.178 Insecu-
 
 
174 Ajit Tiwari, “Govt initiates contacts with Tarai armed 
groups”, Republica, 24 June 2009. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Crisis Group will examine public security issues in a 
separate forthcoming report. 
177 According to the most systematic, but not necessarily com-
prehensive, reports, the police were responsible for nineteen 
of the 44 killings carried out by identifiable groups in the 
first six months of 2009. Two killings were committed by 
the Maoists, ten by various Tarai-based armed groups and 
three by the Nepal Defence Army. The perpetrators in most 
cases, however, remain unidentified. See INSEC, “Trend 
Analysis”, at www.inseconline.org/index.php?type=reports& 
id=3&lang=en. 
178 In a front-page feature on increasing violence even the 
relentlessly anti-Maoist Nepali Times’ top three highlighted 
violent clashes had no Maoist involvement; instead, they 
related to vigilante action by local residents and an armed 
clash between NC and UML student unions. “More insecure”, 
Nepali Times, 10 July 2009. This is nothing new. Brutal 
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rity is partly an outcome of the conflict and the Maoist 
“lesson” that taking up arms can be an effective po-
litical tool. But it is about much more than just the 
Young Communist League (YCL).179 While the Mao-
ists have been responsible for beatings and killings in 
the period since the ceasefire, many more of their own 
activists have been killed – and with much less public 
acknowledgment.180 An analysis of how killings break 
down – by the state, political parties, armed groups, 
criminal groups and the like – reveals a murky and 
ever more confused picture with a multitude of perpe-
trators and victims.181 The sense of upheaval and law-
lessness, even if not borne out by statistics, has also 
contributed to increased vigilantism, underscoring the 
capacity for violence in society at large.182 
Weak judicial system: The judiciary is corrupt, inef-
fective and in need of reform. This reality is widely 
acknowledged by judges, lawyers and politicians alike. 
But there has been no meaningful action. Systemic 
 
 
fights between non-Maoist parties were a feature of the pre-
CA election period (see Crisis Group Report, A Peaceful 
Revolution?, op. cit.), although the changed environment 
has encouraged some participants to forget this. One senior 
UML office-bearer, for example, professed no recollection 
of an 8 April 2008 clash with the NC in his own district that 
had left several fellow party workers seriously injured. Cri-
sis Group interviews, Lamjung district, April 2008 and 
April 2009. Crisis Group witnessed a far larger, and poten-
tially more dangerous, pitched battle between NC and UML 
supporters armed with staves, rods and homemade firearms 
during the by-election in President Yadav’s home village 
(Sapahi, Dhanusha district, 10 April 2009). 
179 A leaked “security agency” report listed dozens of active 
(29) and inactive (25) armed groups and even more unarmed 
struggle movements or pressure groups (141). See Ravi 
Dhami, “Rokiena hatyahimsako shrinkhala”, Annapurna 
Post, 2 July 2009. 
180 For example, UML Youth Force members killed a Mao-
ist black flag waver protesting Prime Minister Nepal’s first 
visit to his home district of Rautahat after his swearing-in. 
The incident was briefly reported in a couple of news out-
lets but did not even warrant mention in the main newspa-
pers. “Maoist cadre assaulted by UML cadres succumbs to 
injuries”, nepalnews.com, 6 June 2009. 
181 Recent terrorist attacks have been more random, and more 
risky to civilians, than almost any assaults during the 1996-
2006 insurgency. For example, the bombing of a church in 
the capital left three dead – while a CA member accused of 
planning deadly bus bombings in Kathmandu in September 
2007, Baban Singh, has managed to have his name removed 
from charge sheets. 
182 There has been an alarming spate of public lynchings of 
alleged kidnappers, initially a series of beatings and immo-
lations in the Tarai and latterly copycat vigilante incidents 
elsewhere, including the beating to death of three teenage 
college students involved in a relatively harmless punch-up 
just outside Kathmandu. 
weaknesses have complex institutional roots, as prac-
titioners have long recognised: an action plan for judi-
cial reform accepts the need for a major overhaul.183 
The outgoing and newly appointed chief justices have 
both emphasised that delays and corruption have un-
dermined the courts’ credibility.184 There has been next 
to no action on addressing conflict-era crimes, includ-
ing investigating disappearances.185 
Development derailed: Basic development is more or 
less on hold. The biannual Nepal Development Forum 
bringing together government and donors, already de-
layed, had been scheduled for May 2009. It was post-
poned indefinitely when the government fell, a step 
symbolic of the disruption to development efforts as a 
whole. Donors could be asking tougher questions of 
both themselves and the major parties. Awareness that 
development as usual is not quite possible does not in 
itself translate into realistic programming to fit with the 
halting transition to peace. The last government was 
excellent at raising money but, despite the many political 
incentives, poor at spending it. Without a radical im-
provement in the political dynamics, the state’s absorp-
tion capacity will remain very low. However generous 
donors are, their contributions will not be appropri-
ately utilised until central and local governance is re-
stored and until they stop subsidising needless security 
expenditure at the expense of basic essentials. 
Weak local governance: Despite repeated promises 
of cross-party agreement to re-establish local govern-
ment bodies, there has been no action. Local politicians 
in several districts cited the absence of elected repre-
sentatives and conflict between parties at the district 
and village level as a major obstacle to disbursing de-
velopment funds and ensuring the provision of basic 
services.186 However, there has been progress on the 
establishment of local peace committees (LPCs). By 1 
 
 
183 Kamal Raj Sigdel, “Massive judicial reforms on anvil”, 
The Kathmandu Post, 18 May 2009. 
184 New Chief Justice Min Bahadur Rayamajhee has called for 
lawyers to help “eliminate corruption from the judiciary”, 
while Nepal Bar Association chair Bishwo Kant Mainali 
argued the judiciary could also help itself “if it delivered 
fair judgments”. “CJ seeks lawyers’ help”, The Kathmandu 
Post, 18 May 2009. Mainali himself had earlier been at the 
centre of a heated row when the supreme court barred him 
from practising for accusing judges of corruption. A more 
in-depth exposition of the new chief justice’s views is 
available in Nepali: “Kanunlai janatale suraksha ra shantiko 
rupma anubhut garna sakun”, interview, Annapurna Post, 
11 May 2009. 
185 Crisis Group will be examining peace and justice issues 
in detail in a forthcoming policy report. 
186 Crisis Group interviews, western and central districts, 
March-April 2009. 
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July 2009, 55 of Nepal’s 75 districts had an LPC in 
place and the MoPR had started deploying secretaries 
to support them. LPCs could be a crucial element of 
the peace process. 
If they function well, they can promote inter-party co-
operation, deal with local disputes before they get out 
of hand, facilitate the provision of relief and rehabili-
tation funds and support the district administration in 
maintaining law and order. In some districts, LPCs 
have, with the encouragement of government officials, 
taken on a broad mandate to deal with sensitive issues.187 
Fostering local collaboration can go some way towards 
insulating against the dramatic ups and downs of na-
tional politics. LPCs bring together party officials and 
figures from civil society, as well as conflict victims 
and representatives of marginalised communities. This 
is a good thing. Nevertheless, LPCs are not a long-term 
solution. They are neither elected nor transparent and 
they risk the appearance of serving political parties’ 
interests (albeit by sharing out the spoils across the 
spectrum) rather than serving local communities’ needs. 
They deserve conditional support, as long as they are not 
encouraged to entrench themselves at the expense of 
the promised return to accountable governance. 
C. HALT MILITARISATION 
Growing military budgets are a worrying indicator. In-
creased post-conflict military spending not only sug-
gests a shaky belief in the ceasefire but increases the 
risk of a return to war. The most serious academic 
analysis of this topic shows that many post-conflict 
governments tend to avoid the “peace dividend” of 
reducing military expenditure on the assumption that 
maintaining high investment will deter renewed con-
flict. In fact, this strategy is “worse than ineffective”: 
“Far from deterring conflict, high post-conflict mili-
tary spending actually significantly increases the risk 
of renewed conflict”.188 Moreover, the authors of this 
study conclude that their results underestimate the risks: 
“Other research has established that high military spend-
ing reduces growth, while growth tends to reduce the 
risk of conflict”.189 A “peace dividend” of sharply cur-
tailed military spending both reduces direct conflict risks 




187 Crisis Group interviews, Syangja, Gulmi and Arghak-
hanchi districts, April 2009. 
188 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Military expenditure in 
post-conflict societies”, Economics of Governance, vol. 7 
(2006), pp. 89–107. 
189 Ibid, p. 103. 
Despite the durable, three-year military ceasefire, Ne-
pal’s 2009-2010 budget increased defence expenditure 
by more than 27 per cent.190 (This figure does not in-
clude funds that are indirectly diverted to the military; 
only those budgeted for the ministry of defence itself.) 
With a total allocation of Rs. 15.6 billion (approx. 
$203 million), more will be spent on the NA than on 
providing electricity – a bizarre prioritisation given 
both the desperate need for power for industrial de-
velopment and the acute shortages that have affected 
the influential urban population. The NA will also 
account for almost as much expenditure as health (Rs. 
18.5 billion/$240 million), and almost as much as 
agriculture and irrigation combined. 
The amount allotted is less than the NA’s own target. 
It had publicly pushed for an increase of over 60 per 
cent; the defence ministry had reportedly called on the 
finance minister to approve a total of Rs. 18 billion 
($234 million).191 Army officers argue, with justifica-
tion, that they need extra funds to address chronic de-
ficiencies in basic infrastructure and equipment.192 
Many soldiers, possibly up to half of the NA’s forces, 
do not have adequate barracks and are forced to live in 
bunkers and other temporary structures. This is a leg-
acy of rapid expansion during the conflict, when funds 
were targeted at immediate military needs rather than 
long-term infrastructure. 
The call to create long-term facilities for an army of 
the current size illustrates the army’s reluctance to re-
vert to an appropriately resourced peace-time role. It 
has also been accompanied by a demand for a large 
increase in helicopters – potentially useful to deal with 
natural disasters but more plausibly requested to pre-
pare for possible conflict. Most importantly, such pro-
curement would provide the multi-million-dollar kick-
backs that the top brass enjoyed during the war and 
have subsequently been deprived of. 
 
 
190 The 2008-09 defence budget was Rs. 12.3 billion ($159 
million); for 2009-2010 the government has proposed 15.6 
bn ($203m). In practice, expenditure may be much higher. 
The revised estimate for actual spending in 2008-2009 was 
Rs. 14.5 bn ($189m) – more than 18 per cent over the 
original budget. Budgets, 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, Gov-
ernment of Nepal. 
191 General Katawal had reportedly asked for a Rs. 20bn 
($260m) budget and ultimately persuaded the defence min-
ister to request the finance ministry for Rs. 18 bn ($234m). 
“NA asks for additional budget”, nepalnews.com, 18 June 
2009. 
192 Crisis Group interviews, senior NA officers, western and 
central regions, April, June and July 2009. 
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As before,193 the headline figures also exclude expen-
diture on civil and armed police, as well as the large 
sums devoted to supporting the 19,000 Maoist com-
batants in cantonments: a total number of personnel 
that exceeds that of the NA. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
most domestic press analyses of the budget barely 
mentioned the extent of expenditure on the NA, Nepal 
Police and the Armed Police Force (APF).194 This de-
spite the fact that Finance Minister Surendra Pandey 
had been happy to tell the international media that 
“My priority in the budget will be to address the secu-
rity issue”, with a particular focus on increasing secu-
rity spending to satisfy industries and investors.195 
The NA has not disguised its deep reluctance even to 
consider reductions in troop numbers until the peace 
process is complete. By this it means it should retain 
its full strength, with enhanced resources, until the 
Maoist combatants have been disarmed and rehabili-
tated, the constitution has been written, elections have 
been held and a new government installed legitimately 
under the new constitution. Even then, it argues that 
there should be no reduction in its strength unless and 
until a full national security strategy is in place.196 
Although the new government has resisted the NA’s 
more extreme demands, its significant hike in defence 
budgets will both stifle economic development and 
increase mutual mistrust by suggesting low commit-
ment to peace. Money will be diverted from vital tasks, 
such as investing in health, education and industry. 
Aggressive signals will be sent to the Maoists. Main-
taining NA recruitment while pushing for PLA degra-
dation is a clear attempt to re-engineer the balance of 
power, which risks pushing Maoist fighters back to 
 
 
193 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Faltering Peace Proc-
ess, op. cit., p. 18. 
194 For example, one detailed survey of key features did not 
mention the defence budget despite discussing the allocations 
for education (Rs. 46.52bn/$605.7m), roads (Rs. 18.49bn/ 
$240.7m), drinking water (Rs. 9.04bn/$117.7m), electricity 
(Rs. 14.69bn/$191.3m), health (Rs. 18.67bn/$243.1m), 
agriculture (Rs. 8.60bn/$112m), irrigation (Rs. 7.95bn/ 
$103.5m) and social security (Rs. 7.78 bn/$101.3m). Ramesh 
Shrestha, “Sector-wise budget allocations”, ekantipur.com, 
14 July 2009. 
195 Cherian Thomas, “Nepal will spend more on security as 
industrial output falters”, Bloomberg, 24 June 2009. 
196 “Any decision regarding the size of the Nepalese Army 
should be taken only after considering the following: when 
a new constitution is made and general election has been 
conducted; new government comes in power and formu-
lates a national security policy; based upon the assessment 
of threats, national economy and other geo political factors 
the need of security forces is made”. “Management of inte-
gration of Maoist combatants”, NA briefing, op. cit. 
war purely to protect their interests.197 In an atmos-
phere already poisoned by the peddling of “Sri Lanka 
models” of all-out war, this step will only further spoil 
the chances for stability. 
D. WORK ON DEMILITARISATION 
The narrow focus on arms, cantonments and military 
matters has, from the start of the peace process, obscured 
the more important issue of demilitarisation. Arms 
monitoring, integration and rehabilitation are all con-
troversial topics. But they are all discrete, small, man-
ageable issues in comparison to the broader question 
of demilitarising the Maoist movement, the state and 
smaller political and criminal outfits. Dealing with Mao-
ist army combatants and the mechanics of NA account-
ability is the first step. Grappling with the transforma-
tion of political and institutional cultures is a longer 
term project requiring leadership, determination and a 
clear sense of direction. 
An obvious starting point would be Maoist action on 
discharging ineligible supposed combatants in line with 
repeated promises.198 This will also depend on the state 
of planning by the MoPR and supporting international 
agencies. Rehabilitation plans need to be appropriately 
tailored and sold to those being discharged, rather than 
imposed. Ideally, a successful discharge process could 
encourage other steps forward and become a confidence-
building tool. If mishandled, however, it could cast a 
pall over the wider discussion of verified combatants’ 
integration and rehabilitation. 
Making the AISC work is critical. Getting its compo-
sition and leadership right is just the start. It must 
separate the technical and political: parties should stop 
pretending the technical subcommittee can take real 
decisions on hotly contested topics. Feeding in techni-
cal options and advice will be essential; it is good that 
there is a mechanism to do this. But it cannot take the 
 
 
197 As Collier and Hoeffler observe, “the longer the peace lasts 
the more the military capability of the rebel organization 
decays. This decay is much more pronounced than for the 
government army. After all, the normal state of government 
armies is to be at peace. They are organized so as to be fi-
nanced without the need to fight, and to maintain a degree 
of combat effectiveness through training. By contrast, there 
is no example in history of a rebel army sustaining itself 
financially and militarily as a combat-ready force through a 
prolonged period of peace”. Collier and Hoeffler, op. cit., p. 91. 
198 For example, as prime minister, Prachanda explicitly prom-
ised action to Radhika Coomaraswamy, UN special repre-
sentative for children and armed conflict, during her De-
cember 2008 Nepal visit. “Nepal Maoists pledge to discharge 
child soldiers: UN”, Agence France-Presse, 5 December 2008. 
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toughest decisions, nor can it achieve much until they 
are made. 
Talking numbers cannot be avoided for much longer. 
When Prime Minister Nepal reiterated in June 2009 
that integration would be completed within six months 
the timetable sounded like wishful thinking.199 His 
government’s official program has formalised this 
commitment, although remaining silent on the parallel 
requirements for security sector reform.200 More im-
portantly, Prime Minister Nepal put the question of 
numbers on the agenda, even if his comments were mis-
quoted. He had reportedly suggested that some 5,000 
Maoist combatants could be integrated into the NA. 
The Maoists cried foul at the figure but the stance, 
if genuine, would be a step forward. First, unlike his 
defence minister, the prime minister would have con-
firmed that significant integration into the NA is part 
of the peace deal; secondly, 5,000 would be a fairly 
generous opening position for negotiations.201 Although 
Nepal denied the comments, Peace Minister Rakam 
Chemjong insisted that even more than 5,000 could be 
absorbed.202 Regardless of any final outcome, talking 
numbers would help. 
International support can be better focused and more 
urgently mobilised. Countries with longstanding mili-
tary links – the U.S. and UK in particular, but ideally 
India, China and others too – should actively explore 
how they could help train integrated NA forces. Con-
version training for former PLA combatants, most likely 
including officer training, will be needed. Reform of 
 
 
199 “Nepal PM says Maoist peace process stalled”, Reuters, 
25 June 2009. 
200 The new government has promised that “The supervi-
sion, integration and rehabilitation of the combatants of the 
Maoist army and management of arms will be done in ac-
cordance with the provisions of agreements including the 
Comprehensive Peace Accord signed between the Govern-
ment of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). 
The supervision, integration and rehabilitation of the com-
batants of the Maoist army will be carried out prior to the 
completion of the task of writing the new constitution”. Poli-
cies and Programmes, op. cit., Art. 19. 
201 While those involved in the early peace negotiations con-
sistently refer to an unwritten agreement that “some thou-
sands” of Maoist combatants would enter a reformed na-
tional army, most non-Maoists cite a figure below 5,000. 
Crisis Group interviews, passim. The total reportedly men-
tioned by Prime Minister Nepal would be especially gener-
ous considering the harm done to the UCPN(M) negotiating 
position by Prachanda’s apparent admissions of inflated 
numbers in the Shaktikhor video. 
202 Chemjong reportedly said that all qualified Maoist com-
batants could be integrated into the NA. “Qualified Militias 
to be integrated into Nepal Army: Minister”, Telegraph 
Weekly, 27 June 2009. 
the NA will also entail revised approaches from inter-
nationals, in terms of attitudes and practical assis-
tance. Detailed plans may be best discussed privately 
with the government but there would be no harm in 
publicly explaining the options available on request and 
emphasising the willingness to support the inevitable 
transition. Those who continue to resist change will 
find their influence in the future, reformed, army much 
diminished. 
Finally, and most importantly, the bigger picture of 
demilitarisation must not be obscured. Quibbling over 
cantonment numbers is natural but does nothing to 
address the much more immediate threats posed by 
groups outside the formal agreements. Militias, party 
youth outfits, armed groups and violent criminal mafias 
represent the reality of militarisation. As long as both 
Maoist and state politics are themselves militarised, 
lasting solutions will remain beyond reach. 
E. STOP SPOILING THE SPOILERS 
The risks of failure are more stark than ever. The re-
frain of “give war a chance” has grown steadily louder 
and more insistent in the months since the Maoists first 
assumed leadership of the government. Senior NA 
commanders talk consistently of the likelihood that 
they will have resumed hostilities with the Maoists by 
the autumn. Diehard anti-Maoists within the army, the 
political parties and elsewhere are pushing hard to make 
this a reality. Maoist firebrands are assisting their 
efforts by insisting on a return to revolution and the 
establishment of a people’s republic. 
Those who want war have not yet won the day. The 
Maoist leadership has not allowed itself to be provoked 
and has reiterated its adherence to the peace process. 
Sensible political leaders in the NC, UML and MJF are 
aware of the risks of a return to conflict and an over-
assertive military. An often myopic media has also 
woken up to the concerted efforts to derail the peace 
process. India, for all its distrust of the Maoists, does 
not want to see armed conflict reignite and would only 
support an army mobilisation, or political interven-
tion, in extreme circumstances. 
This means the priority for spoilers is to create circum-
stances where a return to conflict appears a reasonable 
option. The possibilities here are numerous. One can 
expect efforts to repeat the propaganda coup of the 
Prachanda video, to keep the Maoists on the back foot 
and revive fears over their intentions if they appear 
flagging. A push for “zero tolerance” policing, already 
being touted in the press, could be used to crack down 
on the YCL and provoke a response. Stirring up trouble 
in the Tarai would not be difficult, given the volatile 
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political mix and the opportunities to play on multiple 
divisions. The declaration of a state of emergency 
could be proposed as a reasonable step to contain dis-
order, especially as it would grant the delayed consti-
tutional process a six-month extension. The president, 
given the green light by parties happy that he inter-
vened against the Maoists, may be encouraged to take 
further steps. 
The time has come for powerful Nepali players to make 
their minds up. If Maoist ideologues Kiran, Gaurav 
and their cohorts really want to be pure revolutionar-
ies then they should go back to the jungles, resume the 
“people’s war” and stop pretending to be part of the 
process.203 If visceral anti-Maoists are genuinely con-
vinced they will never change and the only option is 
war then they have a duty to make their case openly 
instead of privately plotting “Sri Lanka models”. If 
fanatics on either side lack the courage to put their 
doubts into practice, then it is time they be told to stop 
undermining the process. It is very hard to build con-
fidence when more extreme elements on both sides 
keep upping the rhetorical ante, implying they have no 
faith in the peace process and fuelling a more confron-
tational atmosphere. 
Civil society may have lost some of its unity and 
credibility but it should be able to unite in pushing this 
message. Wilful spoilers have been incited and in-
dulged by people who ought to know better. It is time 
to stop spoiling them before they have the chance to 
spoil the peace process for good. 
 
 
203 As the Indian Maoists have suggested, they could “real-
ize the futility of going into the electoral game and, instead, 
should concentrate on building class struggle and advancing 
the people’s war in the countryside”. To do this, they “should 
pull out the PLA from the UN-supervised barracks, which 
are virtually like prisons for the fighters, reconstruct the or-
gans of people’s revolutionary power at various levels, retake 
and consolidate the base areas, and expand the guerrilla 
war, and class and mass struggles throughout the country”. 
Open letter to UCPN(M), op. cit. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Cautious optimism is still an option in Nepal but the 
grounds for it are increasingly shaky. The peace proc-
ess has built several impressive achievements, from a 
solid ceasefire to successful elections and the start of a 
democratic constitution-writing process. Many potential 
disasters have been averted. Parties across the board 
have capable and committed leaders who, when push 
comes to shove, are not always as short-sighted and 
irresponsible as their inflammatory public pronounce-
ments suggest. The cross-party capacity for dialogue, 
compromise and cooperation for broader national in-
terest has been dented but not destroyed. 
Most Nepalis have readily accepted the UCPN(M) as 
a political party, albeit with reservations about their 
continued use of violence. However, most would like 
the Maoists to be democratic without simply becom-
ing replicas of the old parties. There remains a strong 
demand for a decisive shift away from the perceived 
corruption, self-interest and destructive behaviour of 
the 1990s. There already is one UML: people do not 
want just another of the same but something fresh. But 
the Maoists often seem to have retained the worst of 
their own behaviour and adopted some of the worst of 
other parties’, instead of the other way round. 
It is naive to pretend that the risks of failure have not 
increased. Consensus politics lies in tatters and diver-
gent interests, always present, have become sources of 
festering distrust and bitterness. With the king gone, 
there is no common enemy to provide a rallying point. 
Political parties are weak and divided; the state is los-
ing legitimacy and capacity. Capable honest brokers, 
so essential in forging the peace deal, are almost ab-
sent. Civil society is fractured; the UN has lost its gloss; 
India appears partisan and interventionist. The incen-
tive of elections, in which all parties could imagine 
potential advantage and which formed a focus for in-
ternational pressure, has evaporated. The constitutional 
process limps onwards but generates little political en-
thusiasm, especially as its completion will trigger fresh 
polls for which most parties are woefully ill prepared. 
Those arguing for a return to war barely conceal their 
agenda – and appear to be finding new takers. The peace 
process has become much more complex and more 
fragile. 
The current heightened tensions and confrontational 
mood are symptoms of how the peace process was 
crafted. It was not based on wide buy-in within key 
parties. For the NC, Koirala ran the show without dis-
cussing strategy with senior or junior party workers, let 
alone selling it to them. Prachanda often moved ahead 
of his party and the PLA, papering over serious dis-
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agreements; key figures such as Kiran and Gaurav, now 
leading the internal opposition, were still in prison 
while the major early negotiations took place and do 
not feel any ownership or responsibility for the twelve-
point agreement or ceasefire. The UML was out of the 
game during the critical early talks and, relegated to 
the role of piggy-in-the-middle, became increasingly 
lost in its own messy internal politics. The NA was 
not represented in the peace talks (and never accepted 
their outcome), still feels unrepresented and has taken 
no steps to make itself institutionally capable of ad-
justing to change. 
Perhaps most importantly, India is now suffering from 
the way it crafted its decisive mid-2005 policy shift. 
Although the decision to drop the king and back a 
Maoist-mainstream alliance was taken after serious top-
level consideration, its implementation was delegated 
to covert intelligence operatives, the government failed 
to bring on board significant opponents (including the 
Indian army and sceptics in many parties) and there 
has been subsequently been almost no genuine debate 
in New Delhi on this most important area of regional 
policy. Parliament has not held ministers to account; 
bureaucrats have neither acknowledged nor answered 
for their mistakes. New Delhi’s own democratic defi-
cit, sadly and ironically, now threatens the democratic 
transition in Nepal that it so bravely backed at the out-
set. Its backtracking threatens both Nepal’s stability 
and India’s own core interests. 
But India, much as it may try, does not rule Nepal. 
Nor is it primarily responsible for Nepal’s problems. 
The peace process can still be rescued and the histori-
cal legacy is still there for political leaders to claim. 
Getting to a ceasefire, elections and a constitution-
drafting process required courage and statesmanship 
on both sides. When pressed, top leaders proved they 
had these qualities. But the political process rests on 
weak institutions. State bodies are alarmingly fragile; 
parties are buried in internal feuds and personality 
clashes. Like it or not, hopes for renewing the drive 
for lasting peace centre on two people: Pushpa Kamal 
Dahal “Prachanda” and Girija Prasad Koirala. The 
dynamics of their critical relationship may have dete-
riorated but they can jump start the process if they 
choose. 
If they recover some of their former boldness they 
could restore much of Nepal’s battered dignity and 
tattered sovereignty. Broadening the peace process to 
bring parties and other players on board could deliver 
on the promise of peace, democracy and change that 
brought people onto the streets in April 2006. If they 
fail, Nepal’s growing inequality, weakening state and 
restive, politically aware population make it a country 
ripe for revolution. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 13 August 2009
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AISC Army Integration Special Committee 
AMMAA Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies, December 2006 
APF Armed Police Force 
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party 
CA Constituent Assembly 
COAS Chief of Army Staff 
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement, November 2006 
CPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
CPI (Maoist) Communist Party of India (Maoist) 
CPN(M)  Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), now UCPN(M) 
CPN(ML)  Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) 
IC Interim Constitution 
JMCC Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee 
LPC Local Peace Committee 
MJF Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (sometimes referred to in other sources as the Madhesi People’s Rights 
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MP Member of Parliament 
NA Nepalese Army 
NC Nepali Congress 
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
PLA People’s Liberation Army (referred to in UN documents and agreements such as the AMMAA and 
December 2007 23-point agreement as “Maoist army”) 
SC United Nations Security Council 
SRSG Special Representative of the [UN] Secretary-General 
UCPN(M) United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
UML Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) 
UNMIN United Nations Mission in Nepal 
YCL Young Communist League 
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